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Abstract  
 
Aristotle’s metaphysics bridges the gap between mind and nature explaining how their 
relationship constitutes development in life. Charles Sanders Peirce’s objective idealism 
similarly aims to investigate how the principles of thought are fundamental in the way the 
universe operates and develops. The method of this inquiry hopes to investigate 
Aristotle’s metaphysics through the scope of Peirce’s objective idealism in the 
significance of the argument that reason is the driving substance for development in the 
world. This ontological position is grounded in Ancient and Pragmatic thinking, 
providing an alternative understanding, that perhaps, challenges the modern narratives 
concerning the concept of evolution.   
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Chapter One: Introductory Remarks     
The term “metaphysics” has historically developed a negative meaning, 
associating the word with that science which investigates the nature beyond the 
physical, excluding the notion of matter.1 This etymological understanding of the term 
metaphysics is often attributed with Aristotle. However, the Ancient Greek phrase 
metaphysiká is vague and has little to do with the issues that Aristotle raises. It simply 
means after the physics, or following the lectures on natural science; with the word 
“meta” denoting a position ‘after’ or ‘beyond’.2 Aristotle provides a definition of 
metaphysics that is truly reflective of the science. Aristotle appropriately uses the phrase 
“first philosophy” to describe metaphysic because it deals with the most fundamental 
and abstract questions of existence. Metaphysics for Aristotle does not investigate 
nature beyond the physical but rather investigates the most essential nature of the 
physical.3 Metaphysics is the inquiry into the very essential nature of the object rather 
than simply what is said about it.4  
The ontological thinking of this inquiry is derived mainly from Aristotle but is 
highly appropriated by the much more recent figure of Charles Sanders Peirce. This 
inquiry will explore Aristotle's metaphysics through a Peircean lens to explain the 
notion of reason and how it is the substance responsible for development in the world. 
The method of this thesis, concerning writing style and philosophical exposition, 
involves considering Aristotle and Peirce together in an interwoven way, instead of the 
more standard method of expositing their views separately then drawing connections 
                                                   
1 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Metaphysics IV.1.1003a1 
2 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Metaphysics IV.1.1003a1 
3 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Metaphysics IV.1.1003b1 
4 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Metaphysics IV.1.1003b1 
2 
 
thereafter. This interconnected style of writing is an application of the Ancient Greek 
way of dialectical writing. This style of writing is integral for metaphysical projects 
because it involves the figuring out and establishing the subject matter instead of simply 
analyzing it. The need for a subject matter in metaphysics is an especially peculiar task 
because the “first philosophy” cannot merely introduce the topic at hand but must 
rather make a statement about the “beginning” in general.5 The point of metaphysics is 
to formulate a beginning and so it cannot, as all other sciences do, presuppose its 
subject matter as something already given.  
Natural sciences, like biology for example, already have at their disposal a pre-
established subject matter, such as living organisms, and preconceived facts associated 
with that subject matter. The task of biology, for instance, is simply to dispense with and 
develop its subject matter. Metaphysics on the contrary cannot presuppose any facts or 
rules of thinking beforehand because these constitute part of its own content and have 
to be established during the very application of the science itself.6 This is why logic is the 
appropriate tool for metaphysical thinking: it involves the working out of the forms and 
rules of thinking necessary for a reliable foundation on which all subsequent sciences 
can be built on.  
The metaphysical project has no mediate place to start and therefore it starts by 
reasoning about where to start. Metaphysics therefore takes this very reasoning that 
asks for a starting place as the very starting place for the inquiry, and delves right into 
the work, asking the question: what is the essential nature of things? In this case, what 
is this “reasoning” that enquires into the essential nature of things? The lack of a 
                                                   
5 Hegel, The Science of Logic, 33 
6 Hegel, The Science of Logic, 34 
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mediate subject matter is the unique property of metaphysics enabling it to a) reflect 
on and criticize the methods of all the other disciplines, b) examine the most general 
concepts of science, for example substance, quantity, relation, etc., and c) explore 
existences that are essential to, and more fundamental than, the physical domain.7   
If this inquiry is to be labelled under a philosophical trope, it can be attributed as 
“objective idealism”.8 However, the reader is urged to refrain from placing an already 
preconceived notion on what objective idealism – a fairly confused philosophical topic– 
might constitute. It is confused in the same way that the term metaphysics is confused, 
because the term “idealism” is ordinarily held to concern the discussion of abstract ideas 
devoid of any concreteness.9 This inquiry aims to establish through its scope that the 
latter claim is far from the truth. In fact, every science is idealistic because the supposed 
subject matter is taken as constituting the ultimate basis for reality.10 For example, 
scientific materialism takes the notion of matter as constituting the absolute substance 
of the universe. Objective idealism is not necessarily ideas devoid of matter, but instead 
the general sense of idealism concerns the influence of mind on the status of the any 
existent.11 Objective idealism is appropriate for this inquiry because the principle of 
reason is contended to be the essential substance for what our organs of sensations 
conceive as material reality. 
The obvious question is: Why is the concept of evolution appropriate to build on 
as a foundation of metaphysics? Evolution in its general meaning involves the process of 
becoming. The term “evolution” has its basis in what the Ancient Greeks refer to as 
                                                   
7 J. Novak communicated 
8 Peirce, Collected Papers 6.605 
9 Hegel, The Science of Logic, 316 
10 Hegel, The Science of Logic, 316 
11 J. Novak communicated 
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movement, change or process, all of which are defined by the Greek term “kinesis”.12 
The term “kinesis” simply means “any difference in something’s condition between two 
different times”.13 This basic understanding of change is informed by the more 
fundamental term for the Greeks, that is, what they called “Energeia”, which means 
activity. Energeia for the Greeks define the nature of “logos,” or in modern terms, 
reason.14 Energeia explains developmental powers and the actualization of capacity. 
The word “capacity” (dunatos) for the Greeks precisely defines the term matter.15 In this 
sense, logos is the substance which has matter as the capacity for its activity. 
Evolutionary metaphysics is concerned with the kind of activity necessary for overall 
development, or equally, the fundamentals of development.  
In recent times, the ontological position of science is accustomed to certain 
theories of evolution and takes those theories as the complete basis for deriving new 
knowledge. The dominant theory in biology today is Darwinian evolution.16 The 
ontological claim dominating many modern theories on evolution is that evolution in 
terms of biological life forms is seen to constitute a separate process independent of 
world evolution.17 This creates a divide between world history and life history, and 
between life history and human history.18 From this ontological point of view, the 
universe is seen as a cycle disclosing no alteration and no aim.19 In the realm of 
biological life and humankind, by contrast, the opposite is true: aim and development 
                                                   
12 Aristotle tr. Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics, Glossary 416 
13 Aristotle tr. Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics, Glossary 416 
14 Aristotle tr. Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics, Glossary 414 
15 Aristotle tr. Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics, Glossary 388 
16 Beatty, The Evolutionary Contingency Thesis 47 
17 Beatty, The Evolutionary Contingency Thesis 47 
18 Beatty, The Evolutionary Contingency Thesis 47 
19 Whitehead, Nature Alive 212 
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are essential concepts for any explanation.20 For example, in animal and human life, aim 
is an essential feature for most activities: hunger aims at food, sexual intercourse is for 
the purpose of reproduction, and so on.21  
 This prompts a question: Why is it that everything in the human realm supposes 
some kind of aim but the universe discloses no aim? The reason is that many 
observations about nature are limited to abstractions.22 Abstractions however only 
provide partial knowledge about the nature of development in the world.23 Moreover, all 
the mental antecedents that we so habitually rely on to derive knowledge are usually 
disregarded as playing a role in the process of world evolution.24 
 In this thesis, I hope to provide an alternative approach concerning the concept 
of evolution derived from the metaphysical works of Aristotle and Peirce. Both 
philosophers argue for the same ontological notion that reason is the driving principle 
for development in the world, and that our understanding about nature will acquire a 
more comprehensive scope if we adopt this ontological view.25 In this thesis I hope to 
achieve several interconnected objectives: a) To investigate the notion of reason, in 
particular as the driving substance for development in the world, based on the works of 
Aristotle and Peirce b) To link the philosophical topics of objective idealism and 
evolutionary metaphysics in a manner so as to show that the development of knowledge 
is intimate with the development of life; c) Moreover to invert through this ontological 
thinking the ordinary narrative that sees matter as the primary condition for the world, 
and instead argue that matter is a quality from the activity of logic indicative to the 
                                                   
20 Whitehead, Nature Alive 212 
21 Whitehead, Nature Alive 213 
22 Whitehead, Nature Alive 212 
23 Whitehead, Nature Alive 212 
24 Whitehead, Nature Alive 214 
25 The term “world” here means the universe, nature and reality. 
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concrete nature of reason. 
This thesis is structured in the following order; in the Second Chapter we will 
explore the process of knowledge in nature. First, we will examine how science is a 
system. Second, it will be important to explore what is meant by the notion of “thought” 
and exactly how thought is related to the object? Finally, we will see exactly what is 
meant by the idea that logic is an activity of thought, and how reason defines thought 
distinguishing two types of logic – natural and formal logic.  
In Chapter Three, we will explore how the constitution of substance defines 
reason. In this way we will explore how form and matter are essential properties of 
nature. Secondly, I will offer an explanation of what it means to possess a “nature”? 
Third, we will examine in what sense does form and matter include efficient and final 
causation? And finally, what constitutes change and the generation of things in the 
world?  
In Chapter Four, we will discover how the development of life is synonymous 
with the development of knowledge, and how in this process the faculties of rationality 
acquire their function. In Chapter Five, the concluding remarks, we will reflect back on 
the scope of the thesis.  
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Chapter Two: Thought is Substance  
2.1.    Scientific Knowledge  
According to the Ancient Greeks, knowledge in the strictest sense is understood 
as “episteme”, which is ordinarily translated as scientific knowledge.26 Peirce explains 
that the best translation of episteme is “comprehension” which is “the ability to define a 
thing in such a manner that all its properties shall be corollaries from its definition”.27 
Unlike what we think of today as scientific knowledge, Aristotle intends the term to 
include knowledge of nature but not to be restricted to it.  
The term “science” is more general for the Ancient Greeks. Aristotle thinks we 
can achieve scientific knowledge of such things as the nature of absolute reality. Peirce 
states that “Aristotle was a thorough-paced scientific man as we see nowadays, except 
for this, that he ranged over all knowledge”.28 Aristotle held that strictly speaking there 
are three disciplines that yield scientific knowledge: metaphysics, physics, and 
mathematics. By physics Aristotle means what today we call the principles of natural 
science.29 He refers to metaphysics as the “first philosophy”.30  
Aristotle believes that all three disciplines provide knowledge that is invariably, 
or at least generally, true. He refers to these three disciplines as theoretical science(s) 
because they provide knowledge that is valuable purely for its own sake.31 What Aristotle 
calls the practical disciplines are studies of morals and how people should live if they 
                                                   
26 Aristotle tr. Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics, Glossary 424 
27 Peirce, Collected Papers 1.232 
28 Peirce, Collected Papers 1.618 
29 Peirce, Collected Papers 1.618 
30 Peirce, Collected Papers 1.618 
31 Peirce, Collected Papers 1.618 
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and their community are to flourish.32 Aristotle frequently warns that unlike the 
theoretical disciplines, the practical disciplines deal with relatively imprecise topics.33 
There will invariably be many exceptions to any general truths about politics and ethics. 
Keeping in mind Aristotle's three kinds of disciplines, let us turn to the most basic of the 
theoretical sciences, metaphysics – “the first philosophy”.34   
According to Peirce, philosophy consists of two parts, logic and metaphysics.35 
Peirce explains that logic is the science of thought in general and not merely the study of 
psychical phenomena.36 Metaphysics on the other hand is the science of being and “not 
merely as given in physical experience, but of being in general”.37 Metaphysics is the 
science that investigates being, not in the same way as any of the specialized sciences do, 
because they study only a specific part of being and not being in and of itself.38 Greek 
philosophers before Aristotle were occupied with the question: What is being?39 
Aristotle makes this question scientific by asking, what is substance (ousia)?40 Unlike 
the concept of being, substance is not vague, because it presupposes a nature with 
particular characteristics that are conceivable.41 Substance is responsible for explaining 
the specific nature of being.42  
In addition to the claim that metaphysics is concerned with substance, Aristotle 
adds that metaphysics is the study of the fundamental principles of demonstration and 
                                                   
32 Peirce, Collected Papers 1.618 
33 Vanier, Made for happiness Loc. 152 
34 Peirce, Collected Papers 1.618 
35 Peirce, “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life” in Selected Philosophical Writings 35  
36 Peirce, “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life” in Selected Philosophical Writings 35 
37 Peirce, “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life” in Selected Philosophical Writings 35 
38 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Metaphysics IV.1.1003a1.25-30 
39 Aristotle tr. Lawson-Tancred, Metaphysics 1028b 
40 Aristotle tr. Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics, Glossary 427 
41 Aristotle tr. Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics, Glossary 418  
42 Aristotle tr. Lawson-Tancred, Metaphysics 1028a 
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logic.43 The reason why the fundamental principles of logic falls to metaphysics is 
because these principles are likewise not concerned with some specific department of 
being, such as the specialized sciences study, but with being as a whole, the province of 
philosophy.44 It is true that specialized scientist, especially natural scientist, have taken 
an interest in the past foundations of logic, but in so doing, they have been using the 
foundations of metaphysics.45 In any case, the notion of substance is wider than the 
natural world, so that the natural scientist would be going outside their field and into 
the realm of philosophy, a move that Aristotle is inclined to take when inquiring into 
nature.   
Peirce explains that Aristotle “was driven to his strange distinction between what 
is better known to Nature and what is better known to us”.46 Aristotle’s claim that things 
can be “known by nature” indicates that there are certain facts that make objects the 
kind of things that they are exclusive of any person knowing them.47 Scientific 
knowledge begins with what is better known to us, based on what we sense and 
understand, but should ultimately arrive at a comprehension of things better known in 
themselves. Peirce elaborates:  
But were every probable inference less certain than its premisses, science, which piles 
inference upon inference, often quite deeply, would soon be in a bad way. Every 
astronomer, however, is familiar with the fact that the catalogue place of a fundamental 
star, which is the result of elaborate reasoning, is far more accurate than any of the 
observations from which it was deduced.48 
  
Aristotle’s notion of science can be interpreted in this way: scientific knowledge is “the 
                                                   
43 Aristotle tr. Lawson-Tancred, Metaphysics IV.3  
44 Aristotle tr. Lawson-Tancred, Metaphysics IV.3.1005a 
45 Aristotle tr. Lawson-Tancred, Metaphysics IV.3.1005b 
46 Peirce, Collected Papers 5.575 
47 Peirce, Collected Papers 6.452 
48 Peirce, Collected Papers 5.575 
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agreement of thought with the object”.49 The “business of science is simply to bring the 
specific work of reason, which is in the thing, to consciousness”.50 Science is the 
“comprehension” of the essential nature constituting the object.51  
Aristotle explains that “the proper object of unqualified scientific knowledge is 
something which cannot be other than it is”.52 Scientific knowledge is achieved when 
“the fact could not be other than it is”.53 By this Aristotle is indicating the distinction 
between a belief concerning the nature of the object and the true conception of the 
object. There may be many beliefs concerning the nature of the object, but there can 
only be relatively few true conceptions about what it actually is.54 The latter achieves 
scientific knowledge, but how do we acquire this? Aristotle explains that scientific 
knowledge is derived by way of “demonstration”. Peirce explains: 
Aristotle argues that there must be certain first principles of science, because every 
scientific demonstration reposes upon a general principle as a premiss. If this premiss be 
scientifically demonstrated in its turn, that demonstration must again have been based 
upon a general principle as its premiss. Now there must have been a beginning of the 
process, and therefore a first demonstration reposing upon an indemonstrable premiss.55 
  
The demonstration is not merely any fact but rather it must have true premises prior to 
the conclusion; that is, the premises must be known prior to knowing the conclusion.56 
When Aristotle asserts that to gain scientific knowledge we must have the “cause of the 
fact,” he is claiming that we must know the reasons why the conclusion is true even if we 
are certain of its truth.57 For example, we can never fully be certain that dropping a ball 
will fall to the ground unless we know the proposition that explains why it falls. We can 
                                                   
49 Hegel, The Science of Logic 39 
50 Hegel, Philosophy of Right 48 
51 Peirce, Collected Papers 1.232 
52 Aristotle tr. Mure, Posterior Analytics I.2 
53 Aristotle tr. Mure, Posterior Analytics I.2 
54 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Posterior Analytics I.2.71b1.20-25 
55 Peirce, Collected Papers 2.27 
56 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Posterior Analytics I.2.71b1.20-30 
57 Aristotle tr. Mure, Posterior Analytics I.2 
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for instance say that gravity is the reason why the ball falls to the ground, which 
becomes in its turn a conclusion that requires further premises that must be 
demonstrated.  
The second condition of scientific knowledge is that we know only the “things 
that cannot be otherwise”.58 For Aristotle, science is only able to process what is possibly 
true.59 It is impossible to think of not-something because then you have thought of it. 
Any negation of a thought is just another thought. For example, it is impossible to think 
of not-a-cat because that triggers the thought of a cat, and in addition perhaps even the 
thought of a dog and so on. By this Aristotle means that anything we know is 
scientifically true when the “necessary conclusion is just equally as certain as its 
premises, while a probable conclusion is somewhat less so”.60 For example, we can 
scientifically know that the three internal angles of a triangle add up to be equal to two 
right angles, or that mammals birth their offspring alive.61 The fact about triangles is 
always true but the fact about mammals is only sometimes true. However even in the 
latter example, according to Aristotle, it is always true that mammals birth their 
offspring sometimes alive and sometimes dead.62 This is simply meant to indicate that 
there are some conclusions whose premises are absolutely true, and other conclusions 
involve multiple true premises absolutely.63  
Once a conclusion is scientifically known to be true it can be used as a premise in 
another syllogism to derive more knowledge. Aristotle thinks that knowledge in a 
particular discipline can be laid out to provide a systematic body of knowledge. Every 
                                                   
58 Aristotle tr. Mure, Posterior Analytics I.2 
59 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Posterior Analytics I.2.71b1.20-25 
60 Peirce, Collected Papers 5.575 
61 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Posterior Analytics I.5.74a1.10-30 
62 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Posterior Analytics I.2.72a1.5-20 
63 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Posterior Analytics I.2.72a1.5-20 
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fact is in turn derived from more basic knowledge. 
According to Aristotle it is important to recognize that not all truths making up 
scientific knowledge are demonstrable.64 There are some premises that are not deduced 
from anything.65 There are premises that provide the basis from which demonstration is 
deduced, and such premises are what Aristotle calls the “first principles” of science.66 
Peirce explains what this means:  
But the Aristotelians, who compose the majority of the more minute logicians, appeal 
directly to the light of reason, or to self-evidence, as the support of the principles of logic. 
Grote and other empiricists think that they have proved that Aristotle did not do this, 
inasmuch as he considered the first principles to owe their origin to induction from 
sensible experiences. No doubt, Aristotle did hold that to be the case, and held moreover, 
that the general in the particular was directly perceived, an extraordinarily crude 
opinion. But that process of induction by which he held that first principles became 
known, was according to Aristotle not to be recovered and criticized. It was not even 
voluntary. Consequently, if Aristotle had been asked how he knew that the same 
proposition could not be at once true and false, he could have given no other proof of it 
than its self-evidence.67 
  
The first principles of scientific knowledge must themselves be knowable, yet they are 
not derived from anything, they must be self-explanatory.68 The term “first principle” is 
somewhat misleading and has several possible meanings. Peirce is not entirely satisfied 
with Aristotle’s argument for first principles. He states:  
Who shall say what the nature of that process was? He cannot; for during the process he 
was occupied with the object about which he was thinking, not with himself nor with his 
motions. Had he been thinking of those things his current of thought would have been 
broken up, and altogether modified; for he must then have alternated from one subject 
of thought to another […] That argument is a representation of the last part of his 
thought, so far as its logic goes, that is, that the conclusion would be true supposing the 
premiss is so. But the self-observer has absolutely no warrant whatever for assuming that 
that premiss represented an attitude in which thought remained stock-still, even for an 
instant.69  
 
                                                   
64 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Posterior Analytics I.3.72b1.15-20 
65 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Posterior Analytics I.3.72b1.15-20 
66 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Prior Analytics II.16.64b1.30-35 
67 Peirce, Collected Papers 2.26 
68 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Prior Analytics II.16.64b1.30-35 
69 Peirce, Collected Papers 2.27 
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Peirce explains that first principles are based on the assumption that the process of 
thought in the mind is really composed of distinct parts, each requiring a distinct effort 
of thought.70 Peirce says that there is no necessity for supposing that the process of 
thought, as it takes place in the mind, consists of distinct arguments, each having a 
previously thought premise.71 This is basically to say that our thinking process is not 
organized in such a way that a first argument is required to initiate it. 
Although Peirce is correct in pointing out that “there is no necessity for a series of 
arguments representing a course of thought to have a first argument”72 – for Aristotle, 
thought, no matter how it operates nevertheless conceives something in the object that 
serves as the object’s first principle.73 By first principle Aristotle is looking for the idea 
essential to the object. In this sense, first principles are ultimately the result of the 
thinking process.74 They are the “universals” perceived by the rational faculty and set 
down as a system.75  
Peirce is saying that the thinking process is not structured in such a way as to 
assume a starting point, but Aristotle says that thought ultimately arrives at the kind of 
structure where there are fundamental and indemonstrable premises in which 
systematic knowledge is based on. Both are pointing out two equally necessary parts 
required for science to achieve knowledge, that is, the process of thinking and its results. 
Knowledge for Aristotle, as well as for Peirce, is a living phenomenon in nature. Peirce 
says:  
This calls to mind one of the most wonderful features of reasoning and one of the most 
                                                   
70 Peirce, Collected Papers 2.27 
71 Peirce, Collected Papers 2.27 
72 Peirce, Collected Papers 2.27 
73 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Posterior Analytics I.5.74a1.10-30 
74 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Posterior Analytics I.6.74b1.5-15 
75 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Posterior Analytics I.4.73b1.25 
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important philosophemes in the doctrine of science, of which, however, you will search 
in vain for any mention in any book I can think of; namely, that reasoning tends to 
correct itself, and the more so, the more wisely its plan is laid. Nay, it not only corrects 
its conclusions, it even corrects its premises.76  
  
This self-correcting feature indicates that reasoning is a natural element because it has 
an immanent movement. For Aristotle, logic is the immanent movement of reasoning.77 
Peirce states that “of the two branches of philosophy, logic is somewhat more affiliated 
to psychics, metaphysics to physics”.78 Aristotle introduces logic to the science of 
metaphysics. As Peirce suggests, logic does not only deal with the right conduct of 
thinking.79 There is a deeper claim here, namely that logic, being the science of thought 
generally, speaks precisely to the metaphysical question of what being is. The affiliation 
of logic to metaphysics is primarily the affiliation of thought to nature.  
Aristotle is extremely interested in logic, not only because logic establishes the 
correct conduct for reasoning but also because he believes that logic deals with the 
nature of substance that generates the forms essential for physics. For Aristotle, logic is 
not only a product derived from human thinking, but it also belongs naturally in the 
world.80 Logic is univocal because the logical system is meant to grasp real abstractions 
concerning the fundamental relations in the world. For example, the laws of thought for 
Aristotle are not just correct inferential rules. The laws of thought are the actual ways 
substance operates.81 The most fundamental principle of all for instance, – the law of 
non-contradiction – describes the most basic nature of substance by stating that it is 
                                                   
76 Peirce, Collected Papers 5.575 
77 Aristotle tr. Lawson-Tancred, Metaphysics IV.3.1005b 
78 Peirce, “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life” in Selected Philosophical Writings 35 
79 Peirce, “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life” in Selected Philosophical Writings 35 
80 Aristotle tr. Lawson-Tancred, Metaphysics IV.3. 
81 Aristotle tr. Lawson-Tancred, Categories 1b1.25–2a1.5-35 
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impossible for the same thing to have and not have the same feature at a single time.82 
This principle is not only an abstract rule but it is an essential fact about the universe. In 
Book five of the Metaphysics, Aristotle goes on to outline a list of logical principles and 
definitions to further describe the nature of substance in the universe.  
The ordinary understanding, on the other hand, sees the laws of thought as just 
another system of inferences that can be disproven by other kinds of formal systems of 
inferences. What the understanding fails to grasp is that the laws of thought are actual 
abstractions taken from the world. Once separated from the world, they are taught as 
valid ways of reasoning, yet they have their origin in the way the world operates.  
Logic immanent in nature is not random; rather, natural logic exhibits complex 
and integral structures characteristic of a thought process.83 When it comes to grasping 
the notion of logic, Peirce is right to say that the formal side of logic is predicated by the 
natural. Peirce distinguishes between what he identifies as logica utens and logica 
docens.84 The latter explains the logic learned as a formal system whereas the former 
explains the “pre-theoretical innate faculty” that thought naturally applies.85  
Logica docens is a formal system of logic taught in schools. The formal side of 
logic is the method of the cognition that extracts from all content, and the so-called 
second constituent belonging to thinking, namely its matter, is said to come from 
somewhere else; and that since matter is absolutely independent from logic, logic 
teaches only the rules of thinking without any reference to what is thought of, that is, the 
object.86 Formal logic in this way sees the rules of thinking as something distinct from 
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the other important element of thought, namely matter, which is what is thinking is 
confronted with in the first place.87    
Formal logic presupposes a separation between thought and the object.88 It 
assumes that the material of knowing is merely present on its own account as a ready-
made world apart from thought, and that thinking on its own is empty and external 
from the object.89 In this sense, thinking receives the material external from it and thus 
acquires the content for its knowledge; yet at the same time, when thought completes 
itself with this external content, it excludes the object as playing a role in its forms of 
thinking?90 
The concept of abstraction, in one sense, explains how the human understanding 
deals with the material world. Peirce defines “abstraction” as follows:  
Abstraction [aphaeresis] is the separation in thought of an attribute or relation from its 
subject, by neglecting the latter. This seems to be its sense, in Aristotle [...] Such a 
separation of matter and form, or of certain characters from others, but not of one thing 
from another.91 
 
The ordinary understanding is endowed with the capacity to perceive the object and 
then abstract its qualities.92 When cognition makes an abstraction, it regards the form as 
something taken from the matter.93 This assumes that the forms derived from matter, 
for example, mathematical relations such as size, density, shapes and so on; are qualities 
that only come after the inception of the material object.94 The ordinary understanding 
misses the fact that the object is also the particular configuration of those qualities in 
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the first place before a concept can be derived from it.95 
Ancient metaphysics in this respect offers an accurate conception of thought 
because in the Ancient era thought is not seen as anything alien to the object, but rather 
is seen as its essential nature.96 Even language, for instance, depends on the affinity 
between thought and object. For example, every word supposes the object of what the 
word indicates and the thought about the object.97 Aristotle examines the relationship 
between thought and object because in this relation, he thinks lies the secret of 
substance.  
 
2.2.    Thought and Object        
 In his work the Metaphysics, Aristotle uses the term “thought” throughout his 
discussion about the prime mover.98 In one idiomatic use, thought is defined by the 
Ancient term nous, which is translated as the understanding and is represented by the 
word “sense”.99 For example, someone with nous has common sense; he or she 
understands what is going on and reacts sensibly.100 In the Metaphysics however, 
Aristotle has a more restrictive use of the word thought, one that is more general than 
its idiomatic usage.  
Aristotle says that “human thought, or rather the thought of composite objects, is 
in a certain period of time” whereas “eternity is the thought which has itself for its 
object”.101 For Aristotle, thought is not reducible to the “sense” associated with the 
understanding of individuals. Aristotle sees thought as an element in the universe, in the 
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same way that corporeal bodies are elements in nature, like “the bodies of animals and 
their parts and with vegetable bodies, and similarly also with those of the elements.”102 
Except unlike corporeal elements, which are “subject to increase and diminution”103, 
Aristotle sees thought as the most fundamental substance – “a circular motion” – 
“which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality […] thought 
move in this way.”104 What Aristotle means by the latter claim is simply to say that 
“thinking is the starting-point.”105 Aristotle argues:  
Those who suppose, as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus do, that supreme beauty and 
goodness are not present in the beginning, because the beginnings both of plants and of 
animals are causes, but beauty and completeness are in the effects of these, are wrong in 
their opinion. For the seed comes from other individuals which are prior and complete, 
and the first thing is not seed but the complete being, [1073a1] e.g. we must say that 
before the seed there is a man,—not the man produced from the seed, but another from 
whom the seed comes.106  
  
Aristotle here explains that the whole is fundamental to the parts. Aristotle points out 
the complex relation between the whole and parts. He says:  
Evidently even of the things that are thought to be substances, most are only 
potentialities,—e.g. the parts of animals (for none of them exists separately; and when 
they are separated, then they too exist, all of them, merely as matter) and earth and fire 
and air; for none of them is one, but they are like a heap before it is fused by heat and 
some one thing is made out of the bits. One might suppose [10] especially that the parts 
of living things and the corresponding parts of the soul are both, i.e. exist both actually 
and potentially, because they have sources of movement in something in their joints; for 
which reason some animals live when divided. Yet all the parts must exist only 
potentially, when they are one and continuous by nature,—not by force or even by 
growing together, for such a [15] phenomenon is an abnormality.107  
 
In this passage Aristotle hints at the following paradox in metaphysics: there are parts 
within parts that are not considered substances because some parts are only powers, or 
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potencies, contributing to the whole.108 The whole however is only complete because of 
its parts.109 Although each part on its own is a whole so as to be an individual part, the 
parts are only parts when they belong to the whole.110  
Aristotle is looking for the universal substance that gives each particular object its 
distinctive nature. The Ancient Greek term for the word “particular” is kath’hekaston or 
kath’kekasta, which means an individual object or a definite nature.111 In fact, claiming 
knowledge of an individual object is to point out its definite nature. Aristotle argues that 
thought defines the nature of the object as a definite and particular thing. Aristotle 
explains the fundamental relationship between thought and the object in the following 
way:  
And thought thinks in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is 
thought in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. And thought 
thinks itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object 
of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and 
object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of 
thought, i.e. substance, is thought. And it is active when it possesses this object. 
Therefore the latter rather than the former is the divine element which thought seems to 
contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best.112 
 
According to Aristotle, the object does not exist prior to the thought of it.113 Thought and 
the object are indivisible in the world because it is impossible for one to exist without 
the other.114 Thought and object constitute a synonymous relation, but they require each 
other differently. If thought is removed and only the object is left, there is no indication 
as to why the object should exist. Without thought, the object may both exist and not 
exist at the same time because there is no means of knowing one over the other. 
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Aristotle says:   
But actuality is prior in a higher sense also; for eternal things are prior in substance to 
perishable things […] The reason is this. Every potentiality is at one and the same time a 
potentiality for the opposite; for, while that which is not capable of being present in a 
subject cannot be present, everything that is capable of being may possibly not be actual. 
That, then, which is [10] capable of being may either be or not be; the same thing, then, 
is capable both of being and of not being.115 
 
Thought is “actuality” because without it “the same thing, then, is capable both of being 
and not being”, that is to say, the thing’s existence is the same as its nonexistence, 
therefore the object does not exist.116 Aristotle explains that thought is the actual 
substance because it is the activity identifying whether the object is “of being and of not 
being.”117 Thought is essential because it identifies the object and therefore gives it 
meaning. The object, on the other hand, is the potentiality of thought because it 
subscribes that meaning.118 Aristotle goes deeper and says that if we remove all objects 
and only thought remains, thought becomes receptive to nothing else but itself as the 
object.119 In the absence of all things, thought identifies itself. 
Aristotle says that “while thought is held to be the most divine of phenomena, the 
question what it must be in order to have that character involves difficulties”.120 
Aristotle aims to clarify what he means by the statement that “thought is the object”, he 
asks the following question: is thought merely the act of thinking?121 Aristotle speculates 
that the act of thinking can belong to the thought of one thing and not anything else.122 
Thought therefore cannot just be the act of thinking because once that act is thought of, 
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it no longer remains the same.123 Moreover, thought is not just the thinking about 
particular things over other things.124 If thought thinks nothing, it is equally nothing, 
while if its thinking depends on something else, then thought is not substance but a 
particular capacity and ceases to be anything else beyond that capacity.125  
Thought, Aristotle says, is not just a particular action that signifies a capacity to 
pick out specific objects. Aristotle says, “Thought in the fullest sense”, “deals with that 
which is best in itself”. “And thought thinks itself” because it is “that which is best in the 
fullest sense”.126 Aristotle makes the crude notion that “thought has itself for its object”, 
which means that substance “must be itself that thought thinks (since it is the most 
excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking”.127 This means that the 
object is always inherently a principle of thought because thought is the element that 
identifies the object.128 The deeper claim is that thought does not only identify the 
object, but in identifying it, thought actually creates the object.129 Aristotle goes on to 
argue that the activity of thought characterizes the notion of “God”. He says:   
 If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our 
wonder; and if in a better this [25] compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And 
life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and 
God’s essential actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a 
living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong 
to God; [30] for this is God.130  
 
The Ancient word for the term “God” is theos or theios, which is interchangeable with 
the word “divine”.131 Aristotle notices that the word “divine” indicates something beyond 
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normal human capacities.132 He also critiques the traditional views of the gods by 
referring to them as objects of worship, prayer and sacrifice.133 Aristotle wants to correct 
some common anthropomorphic views of the gods. God cannot have anything like 
human personalities.134 Aristotle associates the divine being with a rational soul with no 
feelings; it is self-sufficient, permanent and essential feature of the universe.135 God is 
always in the activity of contemplation, and this is the object of divine “pleasure”.136 
God, Aristotle argues, is the pure activity of thought.  
God is therefore the ideal of thought in so far as the human being has the capacity 
for rational study, and the activity of this capacity is the single activity that best fulfils 
the criteria for wellbeing – or as Aristotle calls it– Eudaimonia.137 Eudaimonia renders 
a meaning beyond human pleasure or so-called “happiness”.138 Eudaimonia is the 
complete state of being. It is complete because it is the most comprehensive; there is no 
more comprehensive end for it to promote.139 Aristotle makes the same point in calling 
God self-sufficient and lacking nothing.140 In this way, Eudaimonia is the state of the 
divine, which includes all other ends pursued for themselves. The “virtuous” person 
partakes in this divine state of being by engaging in “intelligence”, which deliberates and 
finds what is “right” to do.141 The result is that the virtuous person partakes in the divine 
nature of thought by deciding to pursue action for its own sake.142 
 In the same way that the sensible forms are objects in human thought, Aristotle 
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argues that life, human beings and the universe are actually objects in the thought of 
God. What we see as objects are really the ideas of divine thought. Aristotle does not go 
any further to elaborate on this perplexing notion, either because this is where his work 
ends, or because fragments of Aristotle’s work have been lost throughout history. 
Aristotle does however explain the specific details of thought. 
 
2.3.    Logos is Natural Formula  
The concept “Reason” explain precisely what Aristotle means by thought as the 
substance in the universe. Aristotle says: “For Reason is one, so that if matter also is 
one, that must have come to be in actuality what the matter was in potentiality. The 
causes and the principles, then, are three, two being the pair of contraries of which one 
is formula and form and the other is privation, and the third being the matter.”143 
Reason denotes the conceivable characteristics that constitute the nature of thought. 
Aristotle employs the Ancient term “logos” to define reason. Logos indicates the 
activities and structures essential in objects.144 When Aristotle says that the object 
possess “logos”, he is looking for the formula of the object.145 The formula of the object 
in succession allows for a true definition.146 Aristotle says that the formula of the object 
is logic, which defines thought as the “thinking on thinking.”147 This means two things: 
first, logic is the activity of thought that generates the form of the object; and second, 
logic is also the systematic thinking about the object of thought.148 Logic is both the 
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natural formula of the object and its scientific definition.149  
Aristotelian logic in this sense is defined by the ontological concept of “internal 
relations,” which may be described as follows:  
Internal relations – embraces all those ontologies which assume relations are internal, 
meaning by this that an ultimate component’s essential qualities are the outcome of its 
relations and that the component is itself a quality, an adjective, of its situation.150 
 
Internal relations define the foundational determinations of logic; the proposition of one 
thing cannot be made without the presupposition of another. For example, if not-P is 
proposed, then P is invariably presupposed.151 The proposition of not-P gives rise to P as 
something distinct, and vice versa.152 Logic is “indivisible” substance because its 
relations constitute structures such that, if one component is missing, the entire system 
collapses. Peirce compares logic with mathematics in this way:   
Where a mathematical calculus aims to reduce the number of intermediate steps 
necessary to reach a conclusion, a logical calculus expands the number of steps in order 
to better demonstrate the validity of the argument.153  
 
Mathematics aims to reach resolution by the fewest number of steps, whereas logic aims 
to point out every possible step. Logic according to Peirce is foundational for 
mathematics because all the possibilities of a calculus must first be shown before we can 
ascertain the fastest route to resolve the calculus.154 Similarly, internal relation is the 
necessary concept for the counterpart ontology external relations. The concept of 
“external relations” is defined as follows:  
External relations – embraces all those ontologies which assume these relations are 
external, meaning by this that the essential qualities of an ultimate component (an 
“atom”) exist independently of its relations and that an ultimate component possesses 
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qualities without being itself a quality.155 
 
Internal and external relations are two sides of the same coin because the former 
explains the generation of form while the latter explains the changes that form 
undergoes after generation.156 The distinction made by Aristotle between thought and its 
object outlines some fundamental questions in his metaphysics; namely, what is the 
mind in relationship to nature?157 Is reason a property of the mind or of nature, and 
what is the difference between form and matter when trying to understand the 
similarities between thought and object? Let us turn to the subsequent chapters to 
explore these questions.  
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Chapter Three: The Nature of Substance 
3.1.    Form and Matter   
Aristotle’s method of inquiry requires us to begin with things that seem to be 
obviously true.158 Then we look for the principles that will best explain them. Aristotle’s 
investigation into what is true begins with the assumption that “real” things are the 
individual objects we see and feel, for example trees, dogs, people and so on.159 
However, Aristotle is concerned with the more fundamental notion of substance (ousia), 
which he believes is the definition of truth.160 Aristotle explains:  
We have said that the causes, principles, and elements of substances are the object of 
our search. And some substances are recognized by everyone, but some have been 
advocated by particular schools. Those generally recognized are the natural substances, 
i.e. fire, earth, water, air, &c., the simple bodies; second plants and their parts, and 
animals and the parts of animals; and finally the physical universe and its parts.161 
  
Aristotle illustrates what other philosophers take to be true. He argues: 
Some particular schools say that Forms and the objects of mathematics are substances. 
And it follows from our arguments that there are other substances, the essence and the 
substratum. Again, in another way the genus seems more substantial than the species, 
and the universal than the particulars. And with the universal and the genus the Ideas 
are connected; it is in virtue of the same argument [15] that they are thought to be 
substances. And since the essence is substance, and the definition is a formula of the 
essence, for this reason we have discussed definition and essential predication. Since the 
definition is a formula, and a formula has parts, we had to consider with respect to the 
notion of part, what are parts of the substance [20] and what are not, and whether the 
same things are also parts of the definition. Further, then, neither the universal nor the 
genus is a substance; we must inquire later into the Ideas and the objects of 
mathematics; for some say these exist apart from sensible substances.162  
 
Some philosophers think that nothing is a substance except things that can be sensed.163 
Empiricists for example in Ancient times and up to this day think in this way. Other 
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philosophers believe that there are eternal beings, which are more numerable and real. 
Plato for example thinks that “Ideas,” or what he identifies as the Forms, are the truest 
substance in the world.164 The Forms and the mathematical relations are substances that 
are more real for Plato than sensible bodies.165  
It is a commonly held opinion that the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies are 
opposed, the latter being realistic and the former being idealistic. What is often 
overlooked is the fact that both philosophers elaborate the same ontological notion that 
reason is the principle of the world. They differ because Plato indicates how reason is 
the principle of the world, and Aristotle explains why reason is the principle of the 
world.166 By outlining why reason is the principle of the world, Aristotle succeeds Plato; 
that is, Aristotle explains exactly in what way thought operates as the driving substance 
for development in nature.167 In contrast to Aristotle, Plato is an example of a 
philosopher whose thinking does not involve the idea of development, while 
nevertheless recognizing the foundations for it.  
Aristotle enquires into why material substances exist and how they relate to each 
other. Moreover, he aims to discover whether a substance exists that is more 
fundamental than a material body.168 Plato and Aristotle both divide substance into 
form and matter. The distinction between form and matter as separate properties is the 
starting point in philosophical science because it allows for the investigation into the 
essentials of nature. Understanding the relationship between form and matter 
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constitutes the basis for inquiring into substance.169 Peirce states:     
What is the general upshot of all these sciences, what do they all come to? Now in minor 
particulars I am hostile to Plato. I think it most unfortunate that he should in his most 
brilliant works have eviscerated his Ideas of those two elements, which especially render 
ideas valuable. But in regard to the general conception of what the ultimate purpose and 
importance of science consists in, no philosopher who ever lived, ever brought that more 
clearly than this early scientific philosopher.170  
 
Plato achieves the fundamental realization that form and matter are different. Plato 
does this with his argument that Form, or Ideas, are ousia (substances) devoid of 
matter. Plato’s claim that ouisa is devoid of matter creates the basic divide between 
form and matter. Plato however does not adequately describe why form and matter are 
different. Peirce explains:  
Aristotle for example justly complains that of the four kinds of causes Plato only 
recognizes the two internal ones. Form and Matter, and loses sight of the two external 
ones, the Efficient Cause and the End. Though in regard to the final causes this is 
scarcely just, it is more than just in another respect. For not only does Plato only 
recognize internal causes, but he does not even recognize Matter as anything positive. 
He makes it mere negation, mere non-being, or Emptiness, forgetting or perhaps not 
knowing that that which produces positive effects must have a positive nature.171 
  
Aristotle evaluates Plato’s doctrine conceiving reality as consisting of different degrees. 
Plato believes that there are different kinds of substances. First, there are Forms or 
Ideas, which involves concepts and mathematical relations.172 The Forms are such 
things as the concepts of justice and beauty; and mathematical relations are things like 
‘the square root of 4 is 2’ or ‘the sum of the areas of the two squares on the shorter sides 
of a right triangle equals the area of the square on the hypotenuse’.173 Although today we 
think of concepts and mathematical relations as purely abstract, Plato believes that they 
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really exist in the world independently of our conception of them.174  
The second class of substance for Plato is what he calls “sensible bodies”.175 
Sensible bodies constitute a lower degree of reality than the Forms or mathematical 
relations.176 For Plato, sensible bodies are objects that we can see and feel; however, they 
are always subject to change and never perfectly embody any characteristics.177 For 
example, sensible bodies we take to be beautiful always bear some imperfection because 
we can always imagine a more beautiful object. Plato is led to believe that Forms are 
more real than the sensible objects we perceive because concepts exist eternally and 
perfectly, whereas material objects are constantly in flux and imperfect.178  
For Plato, the Forms are distinct from the material world; they are conceived only 
by the “intelligence” and are imperceptible to the senses.179 However, the sensible bodies 
are based on the Forms. This idea makes more sense if we say that each material object 
relates to a concept that explains its constitution. For example, any object we perceive 
with a certain shape is based on certain geometric relations. Plato does not see the 
concept as derived after the conception of the object, as we ordinarily think today. Plato 
rather sees the concept as predicating the makeup of the particular object. For Aristotle, 
the concept and the object are simultaneous. Whether Form is prior to or after matter 
has been a metaphysical concern ever since. 
For Aristotle, the task of the scientific philosopher is to find the common 
elements in all real things. Once these common elements are grasped, the philosopher 
can understand what makes a substance the kind of thing that it is. Aristotle agrees with 
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Plato that all substances are compounds made up of form and matter.180 However, 
Aristotle sees a fundamental error in how Plato conceives this relationship.181  
Plato asserts that form is the requirement for sensible matter, but at the same 
time takes form as bearing a separable existence independent of matter.182 He fails, 
however, to explain how form is necessary for matter and yet separate from it. Aristotle 
agrees that form is the actual substance necessary for matter, but he has a deeper 
concern; namely, how can form be actual substance yet at the same time not act on 
anything; in this case, not acting on the sensible?183 This gives no “explanation of the 
movement, the transition from possibility to actuality. Plato becomes entrenched in the 
formal cause” and overlooks the equally important efficient and final causes.184  
For Plato, the most real things are eternal and unchanging so that any process is 
evidence of a lack of actuality. Plato does not explain how form constitutes actuality 
because he does not explain the process necessary in order for something to be actual.185 
Aristotle resolves this by indicating that the very nature of formal substance is activity, 
and the persistence of the activity is the material substratum.186 For Aristotle, actuality 
is not merely given; rather, it is developed.187   
 
3.2.    The Nature 
Aristotle is deeply interested in nature because he believes that nature is the 
object of thought and the realm where substance develops. He states that it is absurd, 
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even “laughable,” to argue about whether or not nature itself exists. He asserts: 
That nature exists, it would be absurd to try to prove; for it is obvious that there are 
many things of this kind, and to prove what is obvious by [5] what is not is the mark of a 
man who is unable to distinguish what is self-evident from what is not. (This state of 
mind is clearly possible. A man blind from birth might reason about colours.)188  
 
Aristotle explains what makes something natural. He does this by comparing a natural 
substance to something that is produced artificially. He says:  
Nature has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, 
or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration). On the other hand, a bed and a coat 
and anything else of that sort, qua receiving these designations – i.e. in so far as they are 
products of art – have no innate impulse to change.189   
 
Natural objects have an innate tendency to change whereas things produced unnaturally 
have no inherent impulse for change.190 When something has a nature, it is inherently 
able to move.191 For example, if the nature of earth is heaviness, then its locomotion is 
downwards. The term “nature” (phusis)192 has a two-fold meaning: things that develop 
naturally not only exist in nature but they also have a nature.193 For example, we might 
say that it is the nature of the flower to receive light, or that the nature of the tiger is to 
hunt. The task of the natural scientist, in Aristotle’s view, is to discover the natures of 
different things. Peirce says: 
Aristotle, on the other hand, whose system, like all the greatest systems, was 
evolutionary, recognized besides an embryonic kind of being, like the being of a tree in 
its seed, or like the being of a future contingent event, depending on how a man shall 
decide to act. In a few passages Aristotle seems to have a dim aperçue of a third mode of 
being in the entelechy. The embryonic being for Aristotle was the being he called matter, 
which is alike in all things, and which in the course of its development took on form. 
Form is an element having a different mode of being.194 
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Every natural substance is a compound of two things: a) substratum is the material 
making up the substance, and b) form is the organization of matter that makes the 
substratum a particular kind of thing.195 Matter is the nature of substance that is able to 
take on properties without itself being the property-giving principle.196 The form of the 
substance is the activity that makes the nature of the matter perform its characteristic 
functions.197 If a substance lost its characteristic function, it would no longer possess the 
features that make it the kind of being that it was before losing that nature.198 If for 
example a living organism such as a dog dies, it no longer possesses the kind of nature 
characteristic of dogs. A dog is only a dog so long as it continues living and partakes in 
the nature of dogs.  
To say that something has a nature means that its distinctive properties make it 
recognizable as a particular kind of thing.199 The material component of a particular 
object is simply that of which it is made.200 Trees are made of wood; humans are made 
up of flesh, tissue, bones and so on. While matter is a nature belonging to all things, the 
material that something is made of is not the property that gives the object its distinctive 
kind of nature.201 For example, being made of wood will never explain why something is 
a tree, the same wood can be a chair.202 Aristotle argues that if the material component 
does not define the nature of the object, then the other component of substance, its 
form, must determine what it is.203  
                                                   
195 Peirce, Collected Papers 1.22 
196 Aristotle tr. Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics, Glossary 389, 396 
197 Aristotle tr. Lawson-Tancred, Metaphysics 1038b 
198 Aristotle tr. Lawson-Tancred, Metaphysics 1038b 
199 Aristotle tr. Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics, Glossary 416 
200 Aristotle tr. Lawson-Tancred, Metaphysics 983b 
201 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Physics II.1.193b1.5-10 
202 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Physics II.1.193b1.5-10 
203 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, Metaphysics 1070b1.20-25 
33 
 
Aristotle uses the term “form” in several ways. In one sense, form is the 
organization, structure or configuration of the material object.204 In this sense, the 
material that something is made of is based on the structure of the form.205 However, 
Aristotle is searching for what makes something a substance and so he is aiming to 
uncover the essential nature of the particular thing.206 The structure of a material object 
still requires the kind of cause that make it have its structure.207 Peirce says:  
Aristotle’s two grades of being are (potentiality) and (actuality). As regards the two kinds 
of actualities. For activity is the end, and the actuality [energy] is the activity; hence the 
term ‘actuality’ is derived from ‘activity’, and tends to have a meaning of ‘complete 
reality’ [entelechy]. The distinction is thus between the action being accomplished (the 
process of actualization) and the accomplished result of this action.208 
 
Form is not just the structure of matter; it is also the activity that determines the 
property or set of properties that the object must have to be the kind of thing that it 
is.209 Having a form, an essential property presupposes, a) the action being 
accomplished by process of actualization, which determines the final result that gives 
the object its distinctive structure, and b) a kind of efficient cause that keeps the 
accomplished result of this action.210 The efficient cause is simply the subsistence of the 
activity constituting the form of substance. Form is therefore the kind of activity 
necessary for the object’s structure, and so long as something is active, it is material.211 
More will be said about this later in the chapter, but first; how is form related to matter?  
Having form identifies the nature of something because it allows a substance to 
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perform the functions that characterize its species.212 Aristotle thinks that all substances 
of the same nature tend to perform the same basic functions.213 For example, all plants 
go through the process of photosynthesis, all deciduous trees shed their leaves in the 
fall, and humans have the capacity to reason.  
When Aristotle says that the nature of substance is identified with its form, he is 
talking about the notion that the activity of substance defines its material structure. 
Aristotle explains this by critiquing what he sees as Plato’s misunderstanding of what 
the “soul” is.214 In the same way Plato asserts that form is separate from matter, he also 
believes that the soul is able to leave the body. Plato thinks that after the soul leaves the 
perishable body, the soul chooses yet another body to inhabit, even the body of a 
completely different species.215 Aristotle contends that any idea whereby the soul passes 
from one body to another simply misapprehends what the soul is. He writes:  
The view we have just been examining, in company with most theories about the soul, 
involves the following absurdity: they all join the soul to a body, or place it in a body, 
without adding any specification of the reason of their union, or of the bodily conditions 
required for it […] All, however, that these thinkers do is to describe the specific 
characteristics of the soul; they do not try to determine anything about the body which is 
to contain it, as if it were possible […] that any soul could be clothed upon with any body 
– an absurd view, for each body seems to have a form and shape of its own.216 
 
The soul according to Aristotle requires not just a body but also a particular kind of body 
that is able to do particular kinds of things.217 For example, a human soul requires a 
human body; a dog’s soul requires a dog’s body and so on. But if the soul should not be 
understood as something that persists after the body, how do we understand what it is? 
The soul is defined as the essential idea of the body rather than something external to 
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it.218 Aristotle argues:  
Suppose that the eye were an animal – sight would have been its soul, for sight is the 
substance or essence of the eye which corresponds to the formula, the eye being merely 
the matter of seeing; when seeing is removed the eye is no longer an eye, except in name 
only – it is no more a real eye than the eye of a statue or of a painted figure.219  
 
It makes no sense to say that the quality of a material object can exist beyond that 
object, because it would then be something other than what it is. It is clear that for 
Aristotle the matter of something coexists with the idea of it, and the idea of something 
represents the form defining its active function.220  
 Peirce explains that “an ‘idea’ is the substance of an actual unitary thought or 
fancy”.221 The term “actual” for Peirce “is that which is met with in the past, present or 
future”, which is simply to say that actuality, is a cause for any process.222 Anything 
actual either existed, exists or will exist as opposed to something possible which might 
never exist. The mark of existing in time is causality: all actual things and events have 
effects in the world. Ideas constitute actuality because they entail causal efficacy.223 
Peirce says:   
What I mean by the idea’s conferring existence upon the individual members of the class 
is that it confers upon them the power of working out results in this world, that it confers 
upon them, that is to say, organic existence, or, in one word, life. The existence of an 
individual man is a totally different thing from the existence of the matter which at any 
given instant happens to compose him, and which is incessantly passing in and out.224   
 
Ideas are “real”, which according to Peirce, is a word “to signify having Properties, i.e., 
characters sufficing to identify their subject, and possessing these whether they be 
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anywise attributed to it by any single men or group of men, or not”.225 Peirce continues: 
“‘idea’ – nearer Plato’s idea […] denotes anything whose Being consists in its mere 
capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any person’s faculty or impotence to 
represent it.”226 Plato argues that Forms, or “Ideas” are the actual substance of material 
objects, except he does not explain how actuality entails causality. For Aristotle, 
actuality entails causal efficacy because form is the activity necessary for the 
organization of the object that gives it a definite kind of nature. The “idea” as Peirce 
explains, represents the form essential to the material object. In this way the idea entails 
causal efficacy because it allows for natural objects to be identifiable. 
Having an experience of something means to develop knowledge of its idea, but 
ideas are not conjured up by knowledge; instead, they are received by it.227 Experience 
according to Peirce is a “brutally produced […] effect that contributes to a habit.”228 
What we mean by the term “experience” is the effect that the idea has on the mind. 
Experience is the compulsion of the form onto the mind, and this is what it means to 
have an “idea”.229 Peirce argues that ideas “are not all mere creations of this or that 
mind, but on the contrary have a power of finding or creating their vehicles, and having 
found them, or conferring upon them the ability to transform the face of the earth.”230 
For Peirce ideas have “unlimited […] power to work out physical and psychical results. 
They have life, generative life.”231 Having an idea is not a matter of wondering about 
things. Instead ideas spring forth into the mind from the object and the idea represents 
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the form of the object. The evidence for this “stares us all in the face every hour of our 
lives” whenever we perceive an object.232  
The idea is not a hypothesis of what the thing might be. The idea is actual form, 
and serves as the quality of the material substance responsible for structure and 
function. For Aristotle, the soul and the body, or form and matter, are really two 
necessary aspects of the same thing. He says: “we need no more inquire whether the 
soul and body are one than whether a piece of wax and the print on it are the same”.233 
Substance is therefore the indivisible relationship between form and matter in such a 
way whereby both constitute the same object.234 They however do not constitute it in the 
same way.          
Aristotle adds two further conditions for being a substance. First, to be a 
substance the particular thing must be able to perform the function that characterizes all 
other things like it.235 For example, a plant must exhibit respiration just as all other 
plants do. Second, a substance must be able to perform that function independently of 
all other things.236 For example, a plant must exhibit respiration without the help of 
other plants. It follows then that not every object that performs a function is a 
substance. The heart for example clearly has the function of pumping blood through the 
body, but the heart on its own is not a substance according to Aristotle, because it is 
unable to perform its function independently of the body.237 Substance therefore defines 
each and every thing yet operates more fundamentally than each and every thing.  
Substance involves an indivisible but also an inverse relation of form and matter. 
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For instance, form is universal when it provides the object with the function that 
characterizes all other things like it. While matter is particular when it appropriates 
form in an individual manner. However, form is particular when it gives the matter a 
definite kind of nature and matter is universal when it is the principle that is able to take 
on form without providing form. Let us turn to Aristotle’s notion on causation to further 
explain the efficacy of substance.     
 
3.3.    Four Causes   
The Ancient Greek word aitia means explanation or cause.238 In fact, what it 
means for someone to explain something is to point out its cause. Aristotle outlines four 
fundamental modes of causation. This explanation is commonly known as the doctrine 
of the “four causes”.239 Peirce explains:  
As Aristotle remarks, what the Ionian philosophers were trying to find out as the 
principles of things was what they were made of. Aristotle himself, as I need not remind 
you, recognizes four distinct kinds of cause, which go to determining a fact: the matter to 
which it owes its existence, the form to which it owes its nature, the efficient cause which 
acts upon it from past time, and the final cause which acts upon it from future time.240 
 
Thus far, we have been examining the categories of form and matter Aristotle uses to 
understand natural substance. The natural scientist however wants to understand the 
specific underlying ways concerning how form and matter operate as the causes for 
various changes in nature.241 In the four causes, each cause is not only meant to be used 
individually to explain a different phenomenon of change. The causes are meant to 
explain each other. 
For instance, the term “matter” initially had no distinct or exact definition for the 
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Greeks. The Greeks referred to matter as “hyle”, which means “stuff”.242 The term 
matter was simply used for pointing to specific objects, such as wood or rocks. It is only 
until Aristotle that the term “matter” derived the definition of the general substrate. The 
understanding that matter is the substrate only tells us that it is universally shared by 
everything, namely because it is the potentiality of things, but it does not say anything 
more about what this potentiality that is shared might be?  
Matter is usually described in the following ways: first, matter is composite, 
meaning that it is spatially and temporally extended; second, it is impenetrable and 
offers resistance, meaning that it is tangible and visible.243 Both these simply mean that 
matter exists for some specific forms of perceptions, like vision, or it means that matter 
simply exists generally. Either way, this tells us nothing more than that matter exists.244 
This is the same reason why the material property of the object does not explain its 
nature; referring back to the previous example, a table made out of wood will never 
explain why it is a table, the same wood can be a tree. The matter of something simply 
indicates that some quality is there without indicating what the quality is.  
Just because matter is able to take on every property, this is not equivalent to say 
that matter is the cause for every property. In fact, for Aristotle, matter must first be 
indifferent to particular qualities because if it is to be the potentiality of a thing, it has to 
be the neutral substance that can equally be one thing or another. As stated earlier in the 
inquiry, matter is the quality that is able to take on qualities without itself being the 
quality giving principle.245 When Aristotle proposes the term “matter” to mean the 
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particular content of a proposition distinct from its form, he is searching for an 
explanation as to how the nature of matter explains efficient causation.246  
Before Aristotle, the pre-Socratics began, naturally enough, by looking for the 
material cause without fully realizing it.247 But what they were really searching for was 
an explanation of how matter serves as the efficient cause. Ascertaining how matter is an 
efficient cause will explain the subsistence of the objects they perceived around them. 
Aristotle figured out that matter, being the quality able to take on qualities without 
being itself able to endow qualities, precisely explains the efficient cause as the 
subsistence of the object.248 For Aristotle matter is simply the potential substrate where 
the activity happens and where the form of the activity is presented.  
Plato, on the other hand, was occupied with the formal cause but really he was 
searching for an explanation into how form operates as the final cause.249 For Plato the 
final cause is elaborated as the “Good”, which Aristotle appropriates as the telos of 
substance – the form which the activity aims to actualize.250 The final cause is the 
challenging one, requiring further investigation, and it is the one that gives Aristotle’s 
theory of causation a unique place in the development of natural science.  
 
3.4.    Final Causation  
In the Physics, Aristotle explains that everything in the universe, including the 
stars, are moved by the fourth cause.251 Aristotle explains that the final cause, referred to 
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as the telos of the movement, explains why it took place.252 The telos as we will see is not 
some external end for the object but is innate and first in it. All classes of objects in the 
universe operate due to their respective final causes.253 Natural classes are explained by 
fundamental forms, which Aristotle calls the rational principles.254 This is why for 
example the stars move spherically: they mimic intrinsic geometric shapes.255 Peirce 
argues against a view that sees no final causation in nature, he goes on to explains:   
It may be that some reader, even at this day, remains imbued with the old notion that 
there are no final causes in nature; in which case, natural selection, and every form of 
evolution, would be false. For evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out of 
a definite end. A final cause may be conceived to operate without having been the 
purpose of any mind: that supposed phenomenon goes by the name of fate. The doctrine 
of evolution refrains from pronouncing whether forms are simply fated or whether they 
are providential; but that definite ends are worked out none of us today any longer deny. 
Our eyes have been opened; and the evidence is too overwhelming. In regard to natural 
objects, however, it may be said, in general, that we do not know precisely what their 
final causes are. But need that prevent us from ascertaining whether or not there is a 
common cause by virtue of which those things that have the essential characters of the 
class are enabled to exist? The manner of distribution of the class-character will show, 
with a high degree of certainty, whether or not it is determinative of existence.256  
 
For Peirce, the concept of evolution necessarily presupposes final causation. Nature 
without final causation is reducible to fate, which finds no necessary determinacy for 
development.257 For Peirce, there is always a common cause by virtue of which natural 
classes have their essential character.258 It is important then to understand exactly what 
Peirce means by final causation. Aristotle and Peirce understand the phrase “final 
cause” in this way:  
The signification of the phrase “final cause” must be determined by its use in the 
statement of Aristotle that all causation divides into two grand branches, the efficient, or 
forceful; and the ideal, or final. If we are to conserve the truth of that statement, we 
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must understand by final causation that mode of bringing facts about according to 
which a general description of result is made to come about, quite irrespective of any 
compulsion for it to come about in this or that particular way; although the means may 
be adapted to the end. The general result may be brought about at one time in one way, 
and at another time in another way. Final causation does not determine in what 
particular way it is to be brought about, but only that the result shall have a certain 
general character. Efficient causation, on the other hand, is a compulsion determined by 
the particular condition of things, and is a compulsion acting to make that situation 
begin to change in a perfectly determinate way; and what the general character of the 
result may be in no way concerns the efficient causation [my emphasis].259 
 
In the scheme of natural substance, each of the causes presupposes the other. The first 
and necessary cause is final causation. Final causation is not only the end result of a 
process, it is also the initiation for it to begin.260 This is why Peirce does not like to use 
“purpose” as a defining term for final causation because it presupposes some kind of 
external law or force that nature is tending towards.261 Peirce says:  
 [...] we were engaged in tracing out some of the consequences of understanding the term 
“natural” or “real class” to mean a class the existence of whose members is due to a 
common and peculiar final cause. It is, as I was saying, a widespread error to think that a 
“final cause” is necessarily a purpose. A purpose is merely that form of final cause which 
is most familiar to our experience.262 
 
Final causation is the determination that aims at something rather than some kind of 
already predisposed aim. The latter in fact presupposes the former. The telos of a 
process is its final cause because it is the primary activity, which takes on an essential 
form that a) inheres in the soul, which according to Aristotle, is life exhibiting the 
activity of thought, b) is sustained by the process as efficient cause; and c) explains the 
occurrence of the process fundamental to each class of objects in the universe with a 
certain description.263  
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 The efficient cause is instrumental to the activity of the final cause, and on its 
own has no say about the general character of the result.264 Yet according to Peirce, idea 
without efficiency is impossible: 
When we speak of an “idea,” or “notion,” or “conception of the mind,” we are most 
usually thinking,—or trying to think,—of an idea abstracted from all efficiency. But a 
court without a sheriff, or the means of creating one, would not be a court at all; and did 
it ever occur to you, my reader, that an idea without efficiency is something equally 
absurd and unthinkable? Imagine such an idea if you can! Have you done so? Well, 
where did you get this idea? If it was communicated to you viva voce from another 
person, it must have had efficiency enough to get the particles of air vibrating.265 
 
The assertion that the idea brings with it efficacy, means that the efficient cause is the 
indicative effect that form produces during the process of causation.266 For Aristotle, the 
efficient cause is the energy sustaining change without having any specific tendency as 
to what change is for. The physical condition that maintains the persistence of form 
simply means that form is the activity causing change.267 For Aristotle, the term “cause” 
is a thing, not an event, Peirce explains:  
It is generally held that the word “cause” has simply been narrowed to that one of the 
four Aristotelian causes which was named from the circumstance that it alone produces 
an effect. But this notion that our conception of cause is that of the Aristotelian efficient 
cause will hardly bear examination. The efficient cause was, in the first place, generally a 
thing, not an event; then, something which need not do anything; its mere existence 
might be sufficient. Neither did the effect always necessarily follow. True when it did 
follow it was said to be compelled [my emphasis].268 
 
For Peirce, the lay-understanding of Aristotle’s cause narrows the term to mean the 
bringing about of an external effect. The Aristotelian use of the term cause does not 
automatically presuppose with it an effect that is something outside the character 
(ēthos) of the cause itself.269 The efficient cause is therefore the effect that the final cause 
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produces.270 Peirce explains the relationship between efficient and final causation in this 
way:   
Efficient causation is that kind of causation whereby the parts compose the whole; final 
causation is that kind of causation whereby the whole calls out its parts. Final causation 
without efficient causation is helpless; mere calling for parts is what a Hotspur, or any 
man, may do; but they will not come without efficient causation. Efficient causation 
without final causation, however, is worse than helpless, by far; it is mere chaos; and 
chaos is not even so much as chaos, without final causation; it is blank nothing.271 
 
Though every action in the broadest sense has a final end, it does not have only an 
external end.272 Internal and external ends distinguish movements from activities.273 
The efficient cause for example has its movement outside itself because it is the material 
substrate that only exists to sustain the form of the activity. The final cause however has 
its end internal because it is the activity that proposes the form, which then produces 
the idea whereby it comes to life, and takes the actualization of the form as the very 
telos.274  
The efficient cause is the appearance of the final cause – the aesthetic value of the 
form. Final causation is the necessary condition for efficient causation and not just the 
other way around.275 So the notion of final causation is not somewhere, out there that 
the efficient movement is tending towards fulfilling.276 Efficacy is the indicative mood of 
final causation and the latter is the imperative mood of the former.277 We will benefit 
with a clearer understanding of causation in turning to how Aristotle understands 
change in nature.  
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3.5.    Change  
We now have some grasp of the notion that the true nature of substance is 
activity. We might still ask an obvious yet fundamental question: will the true nature of 
something today be its true nature tomorrow? What is change (kinesis) in nature?278 It 
is precisely this question that makes Aristotle’s metaphysics distinctively evolutionary.  
Aristotle argues that nothing in nature is static. It is easy to say that things 
change, but it is hard to say what change is. It is hard to predict what will change and 
what will stay the same; also, when exactly can we say that an important change took 
place? It is difficult for example to know exactly when in the process of evolution, a 
species comes into being or becomes extinct. There are however generalities of change. 
Aristotle says that all change is classified in at least one of four basic ways. He outlines 
these as follows: 
Change in respect to Quality is generation and corruption. Change with respect to 
Quantity is increase or decrease. Change with respect to affection is alteration. Change 
in respect to place is locomotion [paraphrased].279 
  
Generation refers to the existence of quality.280 Quality refers to the specific details 
pertaining to the form essential to the object. Generation is characterized by the term 
“process,” which is better understood via the adjective “processing” (metabole).281 
Generation for example occurs when the union of an egg with a sperm forms an embryo. 
The embryo is a quality altogether different than the individual parts that gave rise to it. 
Increase and decrease refer to changes in size. Alteration occurs when something 
changes from one state to another: for example, when a mammal changes from being 
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warm to being cool.282 Locomotion occurs when a natural substance moves from one 
place to another.283 For example, a rock falling from a cliff to the ground is an instance 
of locomotion. Aristotle argues that all changes in nature exemplify three principles:  
a) The property an object changes from,  
b) the property it changes to, and  
c) the object itself that endures the change.284  
 
Aristotle calls the third element the substratum of the change. Change in the substratum 
with respect to quantity, size and locomotion are obvious enough. Aristotle classifies 
these changes in the following basic ways:   
(1) By change of shape, as a statue; (2) by addition, as things which grow; (3) by taking 
away, as the Hermes from the stone; (4) by putting together, as a house; (5) by 
alteration, as things which “turn” in respect of their material substance. It is plain that 
these are all cases of coming to be from some underlying [10] thing.285 
 
The mathematical elements – addition, subtraction, shapes and so on – are properties 
of the substratum.286 These are straightforward for Aristotle, but what underlies the 
change when a new substance comes into existence or when an old substance ceases to 
exist? Aristotle answers that even when drastic changes take place there must be 
something that endures throughout the change.287 He asserts:  
Now in all cases other than substance it is plain that there must be some subject, namely, 
that which becomes. For we know that when a thing comes to be of such a quantity or 
quality or in such a relation, time, or place, a subject is always presupposed, since 
substance alone is not predicated of another subject, but everything else of substance.288  
 
In each case of change a new form comes into existence but an underlying substance is 
present before, during and after the form’s inception. Aristotle would oppose the 
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theological notion that something can be created out of absolutely nothing. If Aristotle is 
right, at no time in the history of the universe could new substances simply be created. 
For any change whatsoever, regardless of how long ago the change took place, there 
must have been an underlying, unchanging substance.289 This insight from Aristotle 
influences one of the fundamental laws of modern physics: energy is neither created 
nor destroyed, but only altered.  
Change in the substratum is explained by what Aristotle means by “motion”.290 
Aristotle has a unique way of understanding motion. For Aristotle motion is not 
reducible to locomotion. Objects have to first involve a becoming or a generation, before 
they can derive location.291 Aristotle conceives motion logically.292 For example, in order 
for something to move, it first has to be moveable. The part that is moveable is a 
substance that imparts motion.293 Locomotion is therefore a specific type of motion that 
first presupposes the presence of a moveable substance.294 It is commonly said that if 
there is a first moved, there must also be another time when there is no such thing, but 
only something that is at rest.295 But even this very thing that is at rest requires the 
process of change that serves as the cause of it being at rest.296 There must be some 
motion that causes it to be at rest and therefore motion is primary for rest, or that rest 
must also come-to-be that which makes it at rest.  
Aristotle understands motion as the efficient effect representing the activity of 
substance. Motion for Aristotle is eternal because substance is always becoming, and by 
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this presence it causes. Aristotle is looking for the substance that is able a) to produce 
things capable of motion, and b) to produce motion in moveable things.297 Motion 
therefore not only represents locomotion but also generation. 
 In every change, a new property arises, but it is nevertheless a property of a 
substratum that exists before and after the change. However, there remains the question 
of generation, which refers to the change that occurs when a new quality is actually 
formed. For example, if a fruit changes from being green to being red, where did the 
colour red come from? Aristotle answers that all change is really an activity whereby 
something processes from the potential to the actual.298 When the fruit was actually 
green it was only potentially red, and when it changed colour, it became actually red. 
The movement from the potential into the actual explains why every living thing 
develops in a way that manifests its nature. Generation is activity in terms of what 
Aristotle identifies as energeia, which we will turn to next. 
 
3.6.    Potentiality and Actuality in Comparison to the Categories  
 
Peirce’s categories of reality – Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness – are 
comparable to Aristotle’s two principals of substance, identified as potentiality and 
actuality.299 These are intended to describe how the activity of substance generates 
form. Peirce’s categories elaborate the more specific mechanisms that comprise the 
activity. Peirce explains Aristotle’s two principles of substance in the following way: 
For activity is the end, and actuality is the activity. The doctrine of Aristotle is 
distinguished from substantially all modern philosophy by its recognition of at least two 
grades of being. That is, besides actual reactive existence, Aristotle recognizes a germinal 
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being, an esse in potential or I like to call it an esse in future.300   
  
Aristotle characterizes actuality as energeia, by which he means activity, or more 
appropriately as free or complete activity (entelechy).301 Aristotle characterizes 
potentiality as dunamis, which means passive activity and the capacity that is able to 
take form without itself being the form-giving principle.302 Actuality is the active cause 
for change whereas potentiality is the capacity that receives the change.303  
Actuality and potentiality exist synonymously and in fact constitute the opposing 
forces of substance.304 Aristotle associates form with actuality and matter with 
potentiality.305 In the indivisible unity between form and matter, Aristotle gives actuality 
priority over potentiality because he says that it is for the sake of form that matter is 
acquired.306 Matter exists in a potential state purely so that it may come to some 
particular form.307 For example, Aristotle says that animals do not see in order that they 
have sight, but they have sight so that they may see.308 Actuality is a cause in more than 
one sense of a form realizing its potential.309 
There is however a difficulty concerning the relation between form and matter, or 
in more abstract terms, how actuality is related to potentiality. Our ordinary 
understanding, without careful reflection, sees actuality and potentiality contradicting 
one another. If for example thought thinks while first being potentiality it cannot always 
think, or it is not always thinking, because what is potentially true may also be 
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potentially not-true.310 The primary substance must then be actuality. The complication 
is that for something to think it must first be able to potentially think, so that 
potentiality is prior to actuality, since how can something be actual without first being a 
potential?311 But as we said, if potentiality is prior then there is no real reason why there 
should be actuality at all.312 If something is potentially true without being actually true, 
then nothing at all exists, even if it is capable of existing without yet existing.313  
This kind of thinking follows if we adopt the view that either of these concepts 
can exist without the other. The chronological ordering of categories is a trait of our 
understanding that aims to organize the facts it derives in hopes of establishing them. 
When the understanding sees, for example, potentiality coming prior to actuality, the 
term “potentiality” develops the negative connotation of being devoid of any real 
concreteness. For Aristotle however matter is the potentiality of a thing, it is the 
sufficient nature necessarily assumed by any actual substance, and it is obviously not 
lacking concreteness.314 For Aristotle, actuality and potentiality cannot exists without 
each other, instead; each principle is defined by the other.315  
This relates to what Aristotle describes as the difference between possessing 
something and using it. He explains: “Now the word actuality has two senses 
corresponding respectively to the possession of knowledge and the actual exercise of 
knowledge”.316 Aristotle distinguishes between possessing something and using it 
because a living body may possess certain powers yet not necessarily use them, maybe 
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because the body is not yet using them, inhibited from using them or perhaps by some 
other reason.317  
When we say for instance that something has a potential, or in other words, an 
object has not reached its full potential, we are saying that there is an actual nature that 
the object is tending towards fulfilling.318 For example, as in case of any natural object, 
the flower does not blossom due to poor nutrition, or I have the potential of being made 
healthy but at the moment I am not.319 This means that I actually possess the quality of 
health and the flower has the quality of blossoming.320 Potentiality is the efficacy 
whereby one actuality transitions to another actuality.321 The potential is not something 
prior to the actual; it is in fact the continuity of the actual.322 For example, potentiality is 
capacity where illness transitions into health or health transitions into illness, 
generation into corruption or corruption into generation, small into large or large into 
small etc.   
Peirce explains that the potentials that are being generated into actuality are in 
fact the Platonic forms. He states: “The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere 
evolution of the existing universe, but rather a process by which the very Platonic forms 
themselves have become or are becoming developed”.323 For Peirce, the forms 
themselves evolve, a view that Plato would reject.324 The consensus however is that the 
forms are not just mere hypothesises. The forms are concepts that serve as the matter’s 
blueprint. For Plato, the idea of “Beauty” for example is not anyone’s conception of 
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particular objects that are beautiful. The idea of “Beauty” involves a more basic nature 
than a particular object that is beautiful.325 The idea of “Beauty” is just the very general 
form required for beautiful objects to arise as distinctively beautiful.326 For example, the 
form of “Beauty” can be defined as symmetry. Symmetry is first required as a general 
idea before particular objects take on symmetrical properties.  
Now of course Plato fails to explain how the forms are generated into matter, 
which according to Aristotle, Plato merely points to the existence of beauty without 
identifying what is beautiful.327 But for Aristotle, forms such as mathematical relations 
and concepts are processed into actuality, and once they are real, they are alterable into 
each other.328 Alteration in the most basic sense is the physical change between 
generated forms. When a liquid is altered into a solid, this is possible because the liquid 
was potentially a solid.329 Both forms are potentially each other because they are actual. 
They are actual because each form is held by the other in a relation that constitutes them 
as distinctive properties.  
Aristotle goes further than Plato and claims that the general idea of beauty is the 
constitution of the beautiful objects around us, like trees, flowers, animals, all of which 
are forms. The forms are not out there somewhere, who knows where; they are 
immanent in the objects around us. This means that substance is the actual activity that 
potentially has within it all qualities, and the objects we see around us are real ideas 
taking on forms.330 The potential of substance is therefore found in the relations 
between actual forms.  
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Peirce formulates his categories as a “table of conceptions drawn from the logical 
analysis of thought and regarded as applicable to being”, stating that: 331 
The first is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind 
anything. The second is that which is what it is by force of something to which it is 
second. The third is that which is what it is owing to things between which it mediates 
and which it brings into relation to each other.332 
 
There is an underlying suggestion that Peirce’s categories make a chronological order. It 
is more useful, however, not to read these categories as being chronologically ordered, 
although in Peirce’s cosmology they do form a chronology.333 Reading these categories 
chronologically suggests that one can exist without the other; which, when they are 
taken as categories of logic, cannot be true because they form an internal relation 
wherein one category is only present in combination with the others. The categories, we 
can say, are moments of the same substance. 
The category of Firstness is potentiality whose being is vague and is devoid of any 
particular form. 334 For example, imagine staring at the colour red so that your mind 
becomes so infused with redness that it loses awareness of any other thing.335 This pure 
experience of redness is analogous to Firstness. Aristotle similarly associates 
potentiality with matter, which is the general substrate devoid of any particular quality 
but universally and neutrally pertains to all particular qualities.336 Firstness is 
potentiality because it is the possession of quality without its actual employment.  
Secondness constitutes actuality because it is the form of the activity taking on a 
particular nature. In this mode there is a compulsion against Firstness. Peirce says: “I 
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instance putting your shoulder against a door and trying to force it open against an 
unseen, silent and unknown resistance. We have a two-sided consciousness of effort and 
resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably near to a pure sense of actuality”.337 
When the activity takes on a particular actuality, that contradicts its universal 
potentiality. There is then a contradiction in substance between a) universal and b) 
particular.338 The only thing the universal and the particular share in common is their 
opposition, which affirms for both forms, their respective positions as mutually 
exclusive properties.339  
Thirdness is the mode from which relations are observed and represented. In 
Thirdness, the opposition between the universal and the particular itself takes on a 
distinct form.340 Their opposition, which is at the same time their unity, being the only 
thing they share in common, allows for one form to be adopted exclusively from the 
other because there is an alterity where each is perceived from the point of view of the 
other encompassing their difference and their identity.341 Peirce calls Thirdness the 
generality constituting “all” because it is the third mode of mind where the tension 
between forms becomes a habit, forming a generality.342 In this generality, the universal 
and the particular form a unity where they oppose each other. Let us then turn to the 
final chapter to see exactly how substance naturally develops in this way.  
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Chapter Four: The Process of Natural Knowledge        
4.1.    The Development of Knowledge through the Stages of Life 
Aristotle’s views on the mind and its relation to the body are fundamental to 
understanding knowledge and nature. Here we will only explore a portion of Aristotle’s 
theory of mind. Aristotle’s term for mind is often translated as “soul”; the equivalent 
Ancient Greek term is psuchê.343 In spite of this widespread usage, the term “soul” is 
misleading. First, the English word “soul” has a spiritual connotation that is not shared 
by the Greek term “psuchê”.344 Second, psuchê generally has a much broader meaning 
than the term “mind”. Mind in the sense of psuchê is understood as the substance for 
life and not only an organ for reasoning. Aristotle took for granted that mind is what 
makes every living thing alive.345 
 We should notice that what Aristotle is concerned with when proposing the 
notion of mind, is to understand both what rationality is and what makes a living thing 
alive. Peirce says:  
So, those logicians imagine that an idea has to be connected with a brain, or has to 
inhere in a “soul”. This is preposterous: the idea does not belong to the soul; it is the soul 
that belongs to the idea. The soul does for the idea just what the cellulose does for the 
Beauty of the rose; that is to say, it affords it opportunity. It is the court-sheriff, the arm 
of the law.346   
 
The Ancient term psuchê conceives a relationship between mind and life, which explains 
the process of growth.347 Generally speaking, the soul for Aristotle simply means life, 
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and life is the mind’s activity for bringing things into existence.348 Peirce explains: 
Such is everything which is essentially a Sign — not the mere body of the Sign, which is 
not essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power of 
serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such, too, is a living 
consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a plant. Such is a living 
constitution — a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social “movement”.349 
  
Life is the soul of the mind, or in better terms, life is the active character of mind.350 
Aristotle defines psuchê as the motion of thought.351 This means that the soul is the first 
activity of a living body.352 The soul of a living organism is related to its work: the soul is 
the characteristic forms and functions that are essential to the organism and explain the 
other features it has.353  
Aristotle divides the soul into rational and non-rational parts.354 The non-rational 
part of the soul is different from the rational part because it lacks deliberate and 
reflective awareness.355 As we will later see, the rational part of the soul is conscious of 
the essential nature of a thing, not merely of the “pleasant”.356 For Aristotle however, the 
non-rational part of the soul does not imply an exclusion of mind.357 For example, living 
things such as plants are governed by the non-rational part of the soul, they are 
nutritive, but this does not mean that they lack mind, a psuchê.358 For Aristotle, all 
living things, even plants, have mind by virtue of possessing a characteristic form and 
function.359 The classification of life will help explain how even basic life forms are 
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governed by mind. 
Aristotle says there are as many different kinds of souls as there are different 
species. Classifying life is necessary for understanding how mind operates. The 
classification of life relates to the study of genesis.360 Peirce explains:  
All natural classification is then essentially, we may almost say, an attempt to find out 
the true genesis of the objects classified. But by genesis must be understood not the 
efficient action which produces the whole by producing the parts, but the final action 
which produces the parts because they are needed to make the whole. Genesis is the 
production from ideas.361  
  
The total of objects in the universe with a certain explanation is what Peirce refers to as 
a class. Peirce understands the class of things in this way: 
A class, of course, is the total of whatever objects there may be in the universe which are 
of a certain description. What if we try taking the term “natural” or “real class” to mean a 
class of which all the members owe their existence as members of the class to a common 
final cause? This is somewhat vague; but it is better to allow a term like this to remain 
vague, until we see our way to rational precision.362  
  
In identifying a class as the totality of objects in the universe sharing a certain 
description, Peirce explains how we come to understand the genesis of a class in this 
sense: “but one can trace the genesis of a class and ascertain how several have been 
derived by different lines of descent from one less specialized form, this is the best route 
toward an understanding of what the natural classes are”.363 Each class of things in the 
universe is predicated by something more fundamental. Understanding the genesis of 
life requires tracing back the fundamentals to which a class relates. The “natural class” 
in this sense is defined as “the existence of whose members is due to a common and 
peculiar final cause”.364 The specie for Aristotle is understood by the term eidos, which is 
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also the term used to refer to form.365 It is important to note that Aristotle associates the 
nature of a species with the form it exhibits because the form characterizes the natural 
class’s final cause.366 
 Form is explained by the following division in metaphysics, that is, “the 
[distinction between] the universal [and] that of the individual”.367 This division in 
metaphysics describes how thought formulates classifications.368 Natural classification 
is composed of a) general whole and b) particular parts.369 The natural origin by which 
life-forms come to develop involves the connection between a universal form and the 
individual members of that form.370 The universal is the general form, which contains 
the common characteristics that pertain to each individual member, but each individual 
member takes on the general character in a particular way.371 Genesis is explained not 
by the sum total of the parts making up the whole, but rather by how each individual 
part is a conception of the whole.372 The rule of natural genesis is defined by how the 
“means may be adapted to the end”373 and not how the means make up the end.374  
The relation between the universal and the particular explain the form of the 
living organism by stating the genus and the differentia of the genus that isolates the 
specie.375 Often the genus is associated with the question “what?” For example, what is a 
human being? – An animal.376 The differentia that isolates the species is concerned with 
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the question “what sort of?” For example, what sort of animal is a human being? – A 
rational biped animal.377 The genus contains the general form that encompasses the 
multiplicity of differing species. Once the genus groups particular species together based 
on a general form they share, we can go on to classify each individual species as its own 
general form. The species in its turn contains a general morphology that groups together 
a multiplicity of individual members. The genus and the species constitutes a hierarchy 
of life that operates on the notion that the general form determines the individual parts.  
Aristotle suggests that there is a virtually infinite variety of species ranging from 
the simplest plants to the most complex of animals. In this continuum, Aristotle states 
that at the very basic levels of life it is very hard to distinguish between what is living 
and what is non-living.378 Aristotle nevertheless believes that this variety of life forms 
can be classified into three basic categories based on different kinds of eidos exhibiting 
function (ergon):379 the vegetative or “nutritive”, the “sensitive” and the “rational”.380 
This is ordinarily understood as the “three types of soul” argument. For Aristotle, the 
three soul types are really just stages of life, with each stage developing a higher ordered 
form of knowledge.381    
The most basic functional characteristics of all living substance are a) to 
assimilate energy as source or food, b) to increase and decrease in size and c) to 
eventually generate and degenerate in and out of existence through reproduction and 
decay.382 This is the vegetative stage of life, which includes the most basic form of 
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knowledge – assimilation.383 The plant’s capacity to perform its elemental functions is 
derived from assimilating experiences from its environment and reproducing those 
experiences.384 
 The environment is a compilation of rudimentary elements, specifically fire, air, 
water and earth.385 Each element is an expression of an even more general idea.386 Fire 
for example is an expression of heat, heat is an expression of energy, energy is an 
expression of matter, matter is an expression of time, and so on. Without going into too 
much details, we can immediately see that each particular concept is an expression of a 
more general one. The rudimentary elements in the environment culminate into one 
organic whole, that is, the vegetative stage, and this whole assimilates itself into a 
variety of unique individual expressions of that whole. Assimilation can be understood 
in this way:  
The growth of the plant is an assimilation into itself of the other; but as a self-
multiplication, this assimilation is also a going-forth-from-itself. It is not a coming-to-
self as an individual, but a multiplication of the individuality: so that the one 
individuality is only the superficial unity of the many. The individuals remain a 
separated plurality, indifferent to each other…. Schultz therefore says: “The growth of 
plants is a perpetual addition of new parts which did not exist previously”.387 
 
Reproduction in the vegetative stage involves a process where a general form is 
assimilated and multiplied into different unique parts.388 This process reaches a limit 
when there are an infinite variety of different parts that are at the same time 
homogenous to the same form.389 For example, the species of oak tree consists of 
separate individual oak trees that vary in size and shape, yet they all drop acorns in the 
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fall. When we experience an object like an oak tree, we are experiencing a more general 
idea that the oak tree characterizes, namely the vegetative stage, which is the 
compilation of the more general rudimentary properties in the environment.390  
When life forms in the vegetative stage assimilate, they are assimilating every 
possible outcome of the general idea to which they belong. The general form of plants in 
one sense is to assimilate energy as source from the sun, for example, the process of 
photosynthesis. Yet each particular plant of the same species physically varies in size. In 
the general process of energy assimilation, plants increase and decrease in peculiar 
ways, which means that each separate plant involves a unique possible expression of the 
sun’s energy.  
The general form is the same soul shared by the virtually infinite multiplicity of 
individual members.391 In the vegetative stage for instance we see that all individual 
plants are still physically connected. It is not all that clear whether one plant can be said 
to constitute a separate member that can be differentiated from all other plants in the 
species. Especially if for example plants do not possess the ability of locomotion and 
they are all connected by the same underlying root system.  
Each individual plant is therefore a particular expression of the same idea, but in 
the same idea, the particular parts contradict each other while at the same time they aim 
to maintain themselves as part of the same idea. The differences that are present 
between the particular plants in the same species produce immediate interactions. For 
example, the asymmetrical stem structures of plants begin to spatially infringe on one 
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another by virtue of one being taller or shorter in size than the other.392 
 The interactions between life forms create the immediacy for living things to 
maintain their unique structures as particular members of the species.393 Life forms 
therefore develop a mechanism that allows them to differentiate themselves from 
everything else. This mechanism is the power of sensation.394 Aristotle argues:  
[Self-nutrition] is the originative power the possession of which leads us to speak of 
things as living at all, but it is the possession of sensation that leads us for the first time 
to speak of living things as animals; for even those beings which possess no power of 
local movement but do possess the power of sensation we call animals and not merely 
living things.395 
 
The transition of the vegetative stage into the sensitive stage is marked by a 
development of an entirely new kingdom, Animalia (zoön).396 For example, insects are 
the class of life forms that mark the developmental culmination of the vegetative stage 
and the beginning of the sensitive stage.397 In the sensitive stage, all life forms have at 
least the basic sensation of touch attributed with their structures, which allows the 
particular organism to differentiate itself from its species and also its environment.398  
Any organism in which touch resides also experiences pleasure and pain.399 
Pleasure and pain indicate what is good and what is bad for the survival of the 
organism.400 This calls for the development of sense perception (aesthesis), which 
enables an organism to find the things that sustain its life.401 But in order for perception 
to be effective, the organism must be motivated to attain what is good for its living 
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existence. This motive power is desire (orexis).402 Desires are always for something, so it 
would be useless for animals to have desire yet not seek what they want.403 Aristotle says 
that the powers of sensation are an organism’s aptitude to pick out desired objects in its 
environment.404 In the sensitive stage, sense perception develops in life forms the 
capacity of movement from location to location in pursuit of the objects of desire.405  
Desire in this sense aims at some purpose, but Peirce defines “purpose” as just 
“an operative desire”.406 For Aristotle, desire is a mechanism in living organisms that 
enables them to distinguish between what is good and what is bad for their natures.407 
Peirce formulates a more general understanding to the concept of desire. He states: “a 
desire is always general; that is, it is always some kind of thing or event which is 
desired”.408 Desire is the universal form of the sensitive stage of life. Desire creates 
extremely broad classes, but in the pursuit of them, desire becomes more specific.409 For 
example, all organisms generally desire food, but more specifically they also desire 
particular kinds of food.   
Associated with the fact that every desire is general is the additional fact that 
desire is always vague and shifting depending on the circumstances.410 For example, 
omnivores consume food of both plant and animal origin.411 Desire in this sense involves 
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variety, “and as far as we can compare Nature’s ways with ours, she seems to be even 
more given to variety than we”.412 
Desire as a general principle operative in nature is the mechanism for diversity.413 
This is true because desire is not only general and vague but also indeterminate.414 A 
good result for one desire may harm other desires, and so a compromise is reached 
whereby certain desires settle for something less than ideal.415 For example, the eye may 
desire light from fire, but coming too close to the fire will relentlessly consume the body 
that holds the eye. This produces a cluster of desires operating in diverging ways.416 This 
explains why there is such a diverse classification of organisms in the animal kingdom, 
all with distinct spectra of development.  
Desire sustains the living organism to bear the kind form that characterizes its 
species because if it lacks the desire to be the thing that it is, it would cease to be.417 The 
form of the species however directs the particular organism’s desire by defining the 
objects for it. When life forms develop powers of sensation and are therefore able to 
desire, they begin to differentiate between what is pleasant and what is not.418 This is the 
basic form of knowledge as awareness because the organisms are now able to 
differentiate themselves from the objects they desire.419 This enables the organism to 
recognize that the objects they desire have differing natures. But the recognition that 
things have different natures invariably develops the desire to find similarities in those 
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differences, especially similarities that relate to the organism.420 This two-fold 
recognition allows the organism to pick out differences in an object it perceives similar 
to itself. This is precisely why life forms have desire: they seek features that are not 
unique to them in other objects that are like them.421  
The biological concept of sexual reproduction for example is the modern notion 
that describes what individual organisms desire in their own species. Desire is the 
general form of sexual reproduction, which achieves greater diversity in life forms. 
Instead of assimilation, the sensitive stage achieves analyzation.422 Analyzation is the 
ability to separate into constituent parts.423 This allows organisms to differentiate 
qualities within objects.424 Imagine for example a squirrel searching for the finest nut. 
Analyzation develops selection, which creates the ability for the desired qualities to be 
adopted.425 Life forms are no longer just assimilating experiences but are also selecting 
them. This is why sexual reproduction produces a greater diversity of life forms than 
assimilative reproduction. Organisms instinctively select the qualities they desire in 
other objects and adopt them for their own.426  
The Darwinian notion of “natural selection” states that the organisms that are 
well adapted to their environment tend to survive and produce more offspring, but also 
states that competition is the reason why some species of animals adapt and survive 
while others die out.427 This however does not adequately explain why some animals are 
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better adapted to their environment than others, because it leaves unaddressed the 
question of which features of the organism allow for greater chances of survival through 
competition? The answer in Aristotelian terms is that superior adaptation is dependent 
on the animal’s kinds of desires. Darwin’s notion of natural selection is incomplete 
because he forgets to expand on a very important aspect of survival, namely animals’ 
desires. Returning to Aristotle, we see that desire is crucially important for progression 
from the sensitive stage into the rational stage.428 The modern equivalent of this 
Aristotelian idea is Jean Baptiste Lamarck’s account of evolution, which today is 
generally dismissed. 
Lamarck points out a very important aspect of evolution arguably overlooked by 
Darwin.429 According to Lamarck, evolutionary change occurs through a process of “use 
and disuse,” which accounts for acquired characteristics that are inherited by offsprings 
in the next generation.430 Lamarck proposes that the efforts of individuals during their 
lifetime are very important in the traits they will pass on to their offspring.431 
Evolutionary change in this sense is based on what the organism desires and needs, 
resulting in changes in behavior, changes in organ usage and development, change in 
physiological form, and eventually gradual transmutation of the species itself.432 For 
example, Lamarck believes that giraffes used to have short necks at a time when food 
and water was more easily attainable. Giraffes’ desire for more plentiful food made them 
reach for the increased parts of trees, influencing physical changes in the structures of 
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their necks, and these changes were passed down to their offspring.433  
Lamarck also says that body parts that are not being used, such as the human 
appendix and little toes, are gradually disappearing and eventually people will be born 
without them.434 The notion that desire is a key factor for evolutionary development is 
not such a far-fetched idea. For example, the modern study of Epigenetic indicates that 
certain stressful factors in the parent’s environment literally alter the genetics of their 
offspring.435  
Desire also goes beyond mere survival. Alfred North Whitehead evaluates the 
idea that associates evolution with the common phrase “the survival of the fittest”.436 He 
identifies this as the “evolutionist fallacy” because it reduces the general notion of life to 
survival.437 Although survival is clearly a necessary element for any species to continue 
adapting to its environment, adaptation goes beyond survival. In fact, Whitehead argues 
that complex living organisms are generally deficient in survival value.438 For example, 
rocks persist in composition for millions of years, some trees for thousands, and certain 
reptiles and mammals for hundreds, compared to humans with survival typically less 
than a hundred years, and everything in-between varies within that range.439 It seems 
that biological sophistication and longevity are not correlated.440 Aside from lacking 
longevity, many complex biological life forms are either eaten or die out before they 
reach their full survival potential. Any doctrine of evolution must then explain how 
complex living organisms, with such deficient survival power, ever evolved.  
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Whitehead argues that any evolutionary theory must not only look at how well 
the organism adapts to its environment, but moreover how well the organism 
undertakes the task of adapting the environment to itself.441 This means that life forms 
are inversely engaged in modifying their environment at the same time as being 
modified by their environment.442 For example, birds build nests, beavers cut down 
trees and dam rivers, and insects build elaborate social dwellings.443 The organism's 
recognition that there are differences between objects results in the desire to find 
similarities between such differences. This is explicitly achieved in the third category of 
life, the rational stage. 
 
4.2.    The Rational Stage  
 The development of what Aristotle calls the rational stage of life begins when 
desire develops a greater sophistication of awareness.444 The rational psuchê enables a 
higher form of knowing. Any organism possessing rationality, like the human being, also 
possesses the nutritive and sensitive powers.445 But rationality is the power to grasp 
abstractions, or what Aristotle calls “universals” (katholou).446 
In the rational stage, the living being grasps the general form constituting the 
particular objects. When an idea enters the mind from perceiving an object, the mind 
conceptualizes that idea as a universal.447 Mere sensation, by contrast, only allows us to 
perceive the object’s immediate particular characteristics, which Aristotle calls sensible 
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forms.448 For example, vision allows us to see that one thing is black while another is 
white, but when we grasp that both of these perceived qualities belong to say, the same 
zebra, we are employing our rational faculty.449 The mind in this case grasps a 
“universal” because it conceives that both qualities share the same essential 
characteristic.450 Aristotle distinguishes sensation and reason as follows:  
Actual sensation corresponds to the stage of the exercise of knowledge. But between the 
two cases compared there is a difference; the objects that excite the sensory powers to 
activity, the seen, the heard, &c., are outside. The ground of this difference is that what 
actual sensation apprehends is individuals, while what knowledge apprehends is 
universals, and these are in a sense within the soul. That is why a [human] can exercise 
his knowledge when he wishes, but his sensation does not depend upon himself a 
sensible object must be there. A similar statement must be made about our knowledge of 
what is sensible – on the same ground, viz. that the sensible objects are individual and 
external.451 
  
Aristotle indicates that sensation and rationality are different because the former is only 
able to grasp particular features whereas the latter grasps universal features.452 
Rationality desires the general form constituting the individual members, whereas 
sensation has no choice but to conceive only the particular parts.453 Although thinking 
and sensing are different, they are also similar, as Aristotle explains: 
If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon 
by what is capable of being thought, or a process different from but analogous to that. 
The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving 
the form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object 
without being the object. Mind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is 
sensible.454 
  
The organism’s capacity for sensation is present in its power to pick out the aspects of 
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the object that are sensible.455 The sensation of touch for example allows the organism 
to feel that objects are composed of some kind of ridged or soft material structure.456 In 
the same way, the organism’s faculty for reason is present in its power to pick out what 
is rational in the object.457 Reason is receptive to the idea of the object, that is, it’s 
essential form, which involves qualities that are only capable of being comprehended by 
the reasoning faculty and not by the organs of sensation– qualities such as the object’s 
behaviour or geometric patterns, aesthetic value, function and so on.458 Both sensation 
and reason are meant to pick out the nature of the object corresponding to the 
respective faculty. 
 The rational faculty desires the first principles of the object, the idea essential to 
the object. Induction is the natural means that acquires knowledge of first principles. 
Aristotle explains how this is possible in this extended passage:  
If on the other hand we acquire them and do not previously possess them, how could we 
apprehend and learn without a basis of pre-existent knowledge? For that is impossible, 
as we used to find in the case of demonstration. So it emerges that neither can we 
possess them from birth, nor can they come to be in us if we are without knowledge of 
them to the extent of having no such developed state at all. Therefore we must possess a 
capacity of some sort, but not such as to rank higher in accuracy than these developed 
states. And this at least is an obvious characteristic of all animals, for they possess a 
congenital discriminative capacity which is called sense-perception. But though sense-
perception is innate in all animals, in some the sense-impression comes to persist, in 
others it does not. So animals in which this persistence does not come to be have either 
no knowledge at all outside the act of perceiving, or no knowledge of objects of which no 
impression persists; animals in which it does come into being have perception and can 
continue to retain the sense-impression in the soul: and when such persistence is 
frequently repeated a further distinction at once arises between those which out of the 
persistence of such sense-impressions develop a power of systematizing them and those 
which do not. So out of sense-perception comes to be what we call memory, and out of 
frequently repeated memories of the same thing develops experience; for a number of 
memories constitute a single experience. From experience again – i.e. from the universal 
now stabilized in its entirety within the soul, the one beside the many which is a single 
identity within them all – originate the skill of the craftsman and the knowledge of the 
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man of science, skill in the sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere of being.459 
 
Our grasp of first principles begins by perceiving a number of things of the same type.460 
First, the objects of experience are grasped by sense perception.461 Sense perception is 
the immediate form of knowledge because external objects directly stimulate the organs 
of sensation: touch, smell, hearing, taste, and so on. Second, knowledge derived from 
sense perception enables frequently repeated memories of the same thing to constitute 
experience.462 When memory recalls what it perceives from sensation, the mind 
undergoes a process of “induction”.463 Induction allows the mind to access memory to 
recall what it perceived. Induction then begins to reflect on the recollected experiences 
by finding a common characteristic between them.464 Peirce says that “induction, in the 
narrow sense, is that it is the inference of the major premiss … from the minor premiss 
and conclusion, as data, or premisses”.465 Induction is the initial way the mind comes to 
understand the general form of particular parts.466   
According to Aristotle, induction is the active feature belonging to the intuition. 
Peirce understands intuition in the following way:  
But just as a conclusion (good or bad) is determined in the mind of the reasoner by its 
premiss, so cognitions not judgments may be determined by previous cognitions; and a 
cognition not so determined, and therefore determined directly by the transcendental 
object, is to be termed an intuition.467  
 
For Peirce, intuition is activated every time a new object is conceived. Whenever we 
come across a new object, we develop an intuition about it. For Aristotle, however, 
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intuition is able to do more than just conceive the immediate nature of an object. The 
intuition is the faculty where form physically enters the mind. According to Aristotle, 
intuition is able to grasp the essential relations of objects.468  
In any kind of interaction, sense perception grasps that there are objects. Desire 
differentiates between the objects as separate constituents.469 Intuition then grasps the 
nature of the interactions.470 Returning to our previous example, the sensation of 
perception derives that there is a pattern of colours, desire is able to consider that there 
is a distinction between the colours white and black, but the intuition conceives that 
those colours interact in the same particular animal, a zebra.471 Induction then 
concludes that the black and white colour patterns are a common characteristic among 
zebras.472 The interactions among objects triggers an intuitive inclination for the mind 
to see how such interactions pertain to the self that is perceiving them. For example, 
when induction sees that the white and black pattern is a common characteristic of 
zebras, the intuition asks: How is that zebra related to me? The intuition develops the 
faculty of the “understanding”.473  
 
4.3.    The Understanding    
 The intuition develops into the stage of the understanding (nous), “which [is] the 
soul [that] knows and thinks”.474 The understanding is a return to desire, but this time, 
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with consciousness.475 The understanding is the cognition of judgment and 
representation. Desire in its highest form is knowledge as understanding, while the 
highest form of intuition is knowledge as reason. The understanding strives to 
accomplish reason so it is important to comprehend the limits of the former insofar as 
to emancipate the latter.476 Reason is distinguished from the understanding in two 
ways; first, reason exists naturally in the world, and second, reason is the final 
resolution at which the understanding arrives.477 The understanding stands in the 
awkward position mediating the reason natural to the world, and the reason adopted as 
the formal system by the intellect. 
During the stage of the understanding, desire is equipped with the intuition, but 
instead of searching for objects, having already found them, the understanding desires 
the differences in the essential relations constituting the object.478 The understanding 
dissects the universals derived by induction. The nature of the object is received by the 
understanding as two abstractions: a) the material makeup of the object is one thing, 
and b) the form of it is seen as another thing.479 The understanding represents the 
matter of the object as the “concrete”, and represents the form of the object as the 
“abstract”.480 The understanding conceives that the material component is one thing, 
which is external or “out there,” whereas the idea is another thing that is internal, “here” 
in the mind.481 The understanding, on its own, does not make the final connection to 
comprehend that the form and the matter are really two necessary aspects of the same 
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thing. In this way the understanding usually falls into contradiction concerning the 
nature of the object by believing that the very separation it makes is a literal truth about 
the object.482 A perfect example of this is Descartes’ mind-body dualism.  
Descartes for example expresses a dualism between “material substances” and 
“mental substances.”483 The latter is seen as external to the former in that neither type 
requires the other.484 Descartes argues that because the mind and the body can be 
separated by the intellect, they are also separable in external reality.485 But it does not 
necessarily follow that just because we can separate things in our intellect, they are 
actually separable in their concrete reality.  
Instead of induction, which belongs to the intuition, the understanding applies 
“deduction”, which Peirce defines as follows:  
Deduction is that mode of reasoning which examines the state of things asserted in the 
premisses, forms a diagram of that state of things, perceives in the parts of that diagram 
relations not explicitly mentioned in the premisses, satisfies itself by mental experiments 
upon the diagram that these relations would always subsist, or at least would do so in a 
certain proportion of cases, and concludes their necessary, or probable, truth.486  
  
Deduction is when “the mind is under the dominion of a habit or association by virtue of 
which a general idea suggests in each case a corresponding reaction”.487 The 
understanding takes the “universals” from induction, and suggests a corresponding re-
evaluation.488 Once the understanding divides the object into abstract and concrete – 
form and matter – it aims to find further differences in this relation.489 In order to do 
this, the understanding adopts the attitude that sees no relationship between form and 
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matter, and everything is viewed as separate from everything else.490 Georg Wilhelm 
Hegel says: “Thought, as Understanding, sticks to fixity of characters and their 
distinctness from one another: every such limited abstract it treats as having a 
subsistence and being of its own”.491 This feature of the understanding is however 
necessary for achieving reason because without it, “there is no fixity or accuracy in the 
region of theory or of practice”.492 The contribution of the understanding comes in the 
form of distinguishing between things which is necessary for discovering that objects are 
particular parts having their own subsistence and being.493  
The result however is inevitably contradictory because each particular object is 
portrayed as constituting its own universal form. 494 This therefore eliminates any real 
general form that can group the individual objects together. Each part is seen as being 
its own whole without seeing how the whole constitutes the parts. If thought stops at 
this stage of the understanding, the particular objects appear to involve no universal, 
and they lose their essential nature that bears their relationship.495   
Another difficulty strikes the understanding in the analyzation process when the 
form is separated from its matter. The understanding operates on the predicate nature 
of sensation, and sense perception perceives a multiplicity of things simultaneously.496 
The understanding simultaneously examines different objects, and so when the form is 
seen as distinct from matter, it is unclear which matter belongs to which form.497 For 
example, if the understanding takes the animal zebra as the substrate that is one thing, 
                                                   
490 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, On the Soul III.4.429b1.15 
491 Hegel Glossary, “Understanding”  
492 Hegel, Logic Defined & Divided 80 
493 Hegel, Philosophy of History 26 
494 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, On the Soul III.4.429b1 
495Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, On the Soul III.4.429b1.20-30 
496 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, On the Soul II.11.422b1.15-30 
497 Aristotle tr. Jowett rev. Barnes, On the Soul III.4.429b1 
76 
 
different than the colour patterns white and black that is another thing, the 
understanding on its own is unable to associate which characteristic belongs to which 
object. The zebra loses the indication that makes it that animal with white and black 
colour pattern, and as far as the understanding is concerned, any animal can be replaced 
with a white and black colour pattern.   
Peirce’s “maxim of pragmatism” precisely aims to resolve the contradiction 
between the abstract and the concrete.498 Peirce explains:  
Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in 
the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies 
in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional 
sentence having its apodosis in the imperative mood.499  
 
Peirce’s pragmatic maxim rightly recognizes that there is a discrepancy between the 
abstract and concrete.500 The discrepancy between the abstract and the concrete is solely 
a feature of the understanding. There is no such distinction in the realm of reason, 
which is the active substance in the world, as well as the final stage of knowledge. In the 
realm of nature, the indicative and the imperative form an indivisible unity, and this 
indivisible unity is one that the understanding is developing towards.  
Whenever the understanding grows hopeless of ever achieving, by its own means, 
the solution to the contradiction, which it has brought upon itself, it returns back to 
reason, which is in the world, for the resolution.501 In nature, any contradiction is 
equally met with a resolution in that each presupposes the other. In order for the 
understanding to achieve reason, it must recall the nature of the object when first 
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grasped by the intuition, and then confirms which form belongs to which matter.502 
Something grasped by the intuition bears no distinction between form and matter.503 
This is the case because the intuition is the crude faculty which receives the object in its 
natural form. In the same way that the material parts of the object stimulate the organs 
of sensation, the form of the object also enters the rational faculty. Form and matter are 
by nature indivisible, and so when an idea enters the rational faculty from natural 
substances, it enters both as abstract and concrete at the same time. This has to first be 
true before the understanding is then able to separate from and matter into respective 
constituents.  
The intuition grasps all the features constituting the object; these includes logical 
and geometric forms, quantitative properties such as density, size, colour etc. images 
and pictorial properties and so on. The final stage of the rational faculty aims to make 
sense of these properties by synthesizing them into an accurate conception.504 In order 
for reason to be achieved, the relations grasped by the intuition must be brought up in 
contrast to the distillations produced by the understanding. The analytical findings of 
the understanding must then be reorganized into a synthetic resolution that reaffirms 
the true nature of the thing.505 In this way a concept is created that accurately captures 
the true nature of the object.506 The concept is scientific because it is the 
“comprehension” of the true nature of the object, which allows all the properties of a 
thing to be corollaries from its definition.507 It is in this sense that reason achieves 
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consciousness of its self in the object.508  
We have to keep cautious that in theory we divide the mind into separate 
faculties; namely sensation, desire, intuition, understanding and reason, but this is a 
feature of our own understanding at play, in reality they are one holistic system 
undergoing knowledge of the object. It is psychologically difficult for the human being to 
imagine that their essential property, that is – reason, belongs to the world. This is one 
oversight of the human being that has to be remedied by the self-correcting mechanism 
of reason.509 Metaphysics wants to figure out how the reason present in the individual is 
related to the reason existing in the universal. The relationship between the abstract and 
the concrete is intimate in nature. This has been the overarching theme of this inquiry.  
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Chapter Five: Closing Remarks   
The central theme of this inquiry has been the ontological notion of objective 
idealism applied to evolutionary metaphysics, in the significance of Aristotle's 
arguments, and Peirce's analysis, that reason is the principle for development. What 
this means is that evolution is fundamentally a rational process and the properties of 
development are logical. This is the basis by which we come to understand the nature of 
physical reality.  
In the spirit of Peirce’s objective idealism, I provided alternative ways of thinking, 
and clarified Aristotelian concepts, which explain that the development of life is 
correlated with rational development. Several objectives have been accomplished to 
support the thesis argument that reason is the principle for development: In Chapter 
Two, we explored Aristotle’s distinction between things known in themselves in contrast 
to things known by us. This outlined Aristotle’s investigation into the relationship 
between thought and object. In support of this we pointed out that logic is the essential 
activity of thought and we contrasted between two types of logic – natural and formal 
logic. We have shown how natural logic is more fundamental than formal logic. 
In Chapter Three, we explored the constitution of substance – what are the 
essentials of reason? In answering this question, we showed how form and matter are 
the qualities of substance. Subsequently substance constitutes the nature possessed by 
things, as well as things possessed by nature. The inquiry of nature enabled the analysis 
of how efficient and final causation explain the underlying relation between form and 
matter. We also looked at how change is a process whereby things generate from the 
potential to the actual. And finally how the concepts of actuality and potentiality 
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describe the activities that define form and matter.  
In Chapter Four, we explored in greater detail Aristotle’s notion of “mind”, which 
is argued to be the governing principle in nature, and the so-called “soul” of life is its 
active character. This shows how the development of life is at the same time 
synonymous with the development of knowledge, and how in this developmental 
process the faculties of reason acquire their function.  
This thesis has been concerned with providing a general insight into the science 
of metaphysics concerned with the origin and development of life. Some direction for 
future inquiry involves an elaboration of the metaphysical concepts discussed 
throughout this study, but more importantly, the future project appropriating this 
inquiry should focus more on the details of the concepts by actually mapping out the 
logical flow of evolutionary development. Moreover, the ontology discussed throughout 
this study should guide the natural sciences in their inquiry into the mechanics of the 
universe. Let us conclude this thesis with the following quote, as Peirce says, the 
potential of the world is boundless:  
We start, then, with nothing, pure zero. But this is not the nothing of negation. For not 
means other than, and other is merely a synonym of the ordinal numeral second. As such 
it implies a first; while the present pure zero is prior to every first. The nothing of 
negation is the nothing of death, which comes second to, or after, everything. But this 
pure zero is the nothing of not having been born. There is no individual thing, no 
compulsion, outward nor inward, no law. It is the germinal nothing, in which the whole 
universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is absolutely undefined and unlimited 
possibility — boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and no law. It is boundless 
freedom.510 
 
This “absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility — boundless possibility” is the very 
desire of the metaphysician. Whether any one individual can ever fully comprehend this 
“boundless freedom” is the metaphysical question.     
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